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Abstract
Bohmian mechanics is the most naively obvious embedding imaginable of Schro¨dinger’s
equation into a completely coherent physical theory. It describes a world in which particles
move in a highly non-Newtonian sort of way, one which may at first appear to have little
to do with the spectrum of predictions of quantum mechanics. It turns out, however,
that as a consequence of the defining dynamical equations of Bohmian mechanics, when a
system has wave function ψ its configuration is typically random, with probability density
ρ given by |ψ|2, the quantum equilibrium distribution. It also turns out that the entire
quantum formalism, operators as observables and all the rest, naturally emerges in Bohmian
mechanics from the analysis of “measurements.” This analysis reveals the status of operators
as observables in the description of quantum phenomena, and facilitates a clear view of the
range of applicability of the usual quantum mechanical formulas.
∗Dedicated to Elliott Lieb on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Elliott will be (we fear unpleasantly) surprised
to learn that he bears a greater responsibility for this paper than he could possibly imagine. We would of course
like to think that our work addresses in some way the concern suggested by the title of his recent talks, The
Quantum-Mechanical World View: A Remarkably Successful but Still Incomplete Theory, but we recognize that
our understanding of incompleteness is much more naive than Elliott’s. He did, however, encourage us in his
capacity as an editor of the Reviews of Modern Physics to submit a paper on the role of operators in quantum
theory. That was 12 year ago. Elliott is no longer an editor there and the paper that developed is not quite a
review.
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1 Introduction
It is often argued that the quantum mechanical association of observables with self-adjoint oper-
ators is a straightforward generalization of the notion of classical observable, and that quantum
theory should be no more conceptually problematic than classical physics once this is appre-
ciated. The classical physical observables—for a system of particles, their positions q = (qk),
their momenta p = (pk), and the functions thereof, i.e., functions on phase space—form a com-
mutative algebra. It is generally taken to be the essence of quantization, the procedure which
converts a classical theory to a quantum one, that q, p, and hence all functions f(q, p) thereof
are replaced by appropriate operators, on a Hilbert space (of possible wave functions) associated
with the system under consideration. Thus quantization leads to a noncommutative operator
algebra of “observables,” the standard examples of which are provided by matrices and linear
operators. Thus it seems perfectly natural that classical observables are functions on phase space
and quantum observables are self-adjoint operators.
However, there is much less here than meets the eye. What should be meant by “measuring”
a quantum observable, a self-adjoint operator? We think it is clear that this must be specified—
without such specification it can have no meaning whatsoever. Thus we should be careful here
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and use safer terminology by saying that in quantum theory observables are associated with self-
adjoint operators, since it is difficult to see what could be meant by more than an association, by
an identification of observables, regarded as somehow having independent meaning relating to ob-
servation or measurement (if not to intrinsic “properties”), with such a mathematical abstraction
as a self-adjoint operator.
We are insisting on “association” rather than identification in quantum theory, but not in
classical theory, because there we begin with a rather clear notion of observable (or property)
which is well-captured by the notion of a function on the phase space, the state space of complete
descriptions. If the state of the system were observed, the value of the observable would of
course be given by this function of the state (q, p), but the observable might be observed by
itself, yielding only a partial specification of the state. In other words, measuring a classical
observable means determining to which level surface of the corresponding function the state of
the system, the phase point—which is at any time definite though probably unknown—belongs.
In the quantum realm the analogous notion could be that of function on Hilbert space, not self-
adjoint operator. But we don’t measure the wave function, so that functions on Hilbert space
are not physically measurable, and thus do not define “observables.”
The problematical character of the way in which measurement is treated in orthodox quantum
theory has been stressed by John Bell:
The concept of ‘measurement’ becomes so fuzzy on reflection that it is quite surprising
to have it appearing in physical theory at the most fundamental level. Less surpris-
ing perhaps is that mathematicians, who need only simple axioms about otherwise
undefined objects, have been able to write extensive works on quantum measurement
theory—which experimental physicists do not find it necessary to read. . . . Does
not any analysis of measurement require concepts more fundamental than measure-
ment? And should not the fundamental theory be about these more fundamental
concepts? [8]
. . . in physics the only observations we must consider are position observations, if
only the positions of instrument pointers. It is a great merit of the de Broglie-Bohm
picture to force us to consider this fact. If you make axioms, rather than definitions
and theorems, about the ‘measurement’ of anything else, then you commit redundancy
and risk inconsistency. [9]
The Broglie-Bohm theory, Bohmian mechanics, is a physical theory for which the concept
of ‘measurement’ does not appear at the most fundamental level—in the very formulation of
the theory. It is a theory about concepts more fundamental than ‘measurement,’ in terms of
which an analysis of measurement can be performed. In a previous work [25] we have shown
how probabilities for positions of particles given by |ψ|2 emerge naturally from an analysis of
“equilibrium” for the deterministic dynamical system defined by Bohmian mechanics, in much
the same way that the Maxwellian velocity distribution emerges from an analysis of classical
thermodynamic equilibrium. Our analysis entails that Born’s statistical rule ρ = |ψ|2| should
be regarded as a local manifestation of a global equilibrium state of the universe, what we call
quantum equilibrium, a concept analogous to, but quite distinct from, thermodynamic equilib-
rium: a universe in quantum equilibrium evolves so as to yield an appearance of randomness,
with empirical distributions in agreement with all the predictions of the quantum formalism.
While in our earlier work we have proven, from the first principles of Bohmian mechanics,
the “quantum equilibrium hypothesis” that when a system has wave function ψ, the distribution
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ρ of its configuration satisfies ρ = |ψ|2, our goal here is to show that it follows from this
hypothesis, not merely that Bohmian mechanics makes the same predictions as does orthodox
quantum theory for the results of any experiment, but that the quantum formalism of operators
as observables emerges naturally and simply as the very expression of the empirical import of
Bohmian mechanics.
More precisely, we shall show here that self-adjoint operators arise in association with specific
experiments: insofar as the statistics for the values which result from the experiment are con-
cerned, the notion of self-adjoint operator compactly expresses and represents the relevant data.
It is the association “E 7→ A” between an experiment E and an operator A—an association that
we shall establish in Section 2 and upon which we shall elaborate in the other sections—that is the
central notion of this paper. According to this association the notion of operator-as-observable
in no way implies that anything is measured in the experiment, and certainly not the operator
itself. We shall nonetheless speak of such experiments as measurements, since this terminology
is unfortunately standard. When we wish to emphasize that we really mean measurement—the
ascertaining of the value of a quantity—we shall often speak of genuine measurement.
Much of our analysis of the emergence and role of operators as observables in Bohmian
mechanics, including the von Neumann-type picture of measurements at which we shall arrive,
applies as well to orthodox quantum theory. Indeed, the best way to understand the status
of the quantum formalism—and to better appreciate the minimality of Bohmian mechanics—is
Bohr’s way: What are called quantum observables obtain meaning only through their association
with specific experiments. We believe that Bohr’s point has not been taken to heart by most
physicists, even those who regard themselves as advocates of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Indeed, it would appear that the argument provided by our analysis against taking operators
too seriously as observables has even greater force from an orthodox perspective: Given the
initial wave function, at least in Bohmian mechanics the outcome of the particular experiment
is determined by the initial configuration of system and apparatus, while for orthodox quantum
theory there is nothing in the initial state which completely determines the outcome. Indeed, we
find it rather surprising that most proponents of standard quantum measurement theory, that is
the von Neumann analysis of measurement [74], beginning with von Neumann, nonetheless seem
to retain an uncritical identification of operators with properties. Of course, this is presumably
because more urgent matters—the measurement problem and the suggestion of inconsistency and
incoherence that it entails—soon force themselves upon one’s attention. Moreover such difficulties
perhaps make it difficult to maintain much confidence about just what should be concluded from
the “measurement” analysis, while in Bohmian mechanics, for which no such difficulties arise,
what should be concluded is rather obvious.
Moreover, a great many significant real-world experiments are simply not at all associated with
operators in the usual way. Because of these and other difficulties, it has been proposed that we
should go beyond operators-as-observables, to generalized observables, described by mathematical
objects (positive-operator-valued measures, POVMs) even more abstract than operators (see, e.g.,
the books of Davies [21], Holevo [50] and Kraus [55]). It may seem that we would regard this
development as a step in the wrong direction, since it supplies us with a new, much larger class
of abstract mathematical entities about which to be naive realists. We shall, however, show that
these generalized observables for Bohmian mechanics form an extremely natural class of objects
to associate with experiments, and that the emergence and role these observables is merely an
expression of quantum equilibrium together with the linearity of Schro¨dinger’s evolution. It is
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therefore rather dubious that the occurrence of generalized observables—the simplest case of
which are self-adjoint operators—can be regarded as suggesting any deep truths about reality or
about epistemology.
As a byproduct of our analysis of measurement we shall obtain a criterion of measurability and
use it to examine the genuine measurability of some of the properties of a physical system. In this
regard, it should be stressed that measurability is theory-dependent: different theories, though
empirically equivalent, may differ on what should be regarded as genuinely measurable within
each theory. This important—though very often ignored—point was made long ago by Einstein
and has been repeatedly stressed by Bell. It is best summarized by Einstein’s remark [49]: “It is
the theory which decides what we can observe.”
We note in passing that measurability and reality are different issues. Indeed, for Bohmian
mechanics most of what is “measurable” (in a sense that we will explain) is not real and most of
what is real is not genuinely measurable. (The main exception, the position of a particle, which
is both real and genuinely measurable, is, however, constrained by absolute uncertainty [25]).
In focusing here on the role of operators as observables, we don’t wish to suggest that there
are no other important roles played by operators in quantum theory. In particular, in addition to
the familiar role played by operators as generators of symmetries and time-evolutions, we would
like to mention the rather different role played by the field operators of quantum field theory: to
link abstract Hilbert-space to space-time and structures therein, facilitating the formulation of
theories describing the behavior of an indefinite number of particles [30, 29].
Finally, we should mention what should be the most interesting sense of measurement for a
physicist, namely the determination of the coupling constants and other parameters that define
our physical theories. This has little to do with operators as observables in quantum theory and
shall not be addressed here.
Notations and Conventions
Q = (Q1, . . . ,QN) denotes the actual configuration of a system of N particle with positions
Qk; q = (q1, . . . ,qN ) is its generic configuration. Whenever we deal with a system-apparatus
composite, x (X) will denote the generic (actual) configuration of the system and y (Y ) that
of the apparatus. Sometimes we shall refer to the system as the x-system and the apparatus
as the y-system. Since the apparatus should be understood as including all systems relevant to
the behavior of the system in which we are interested, this notation and terminology is quite
compatible with that of Section 2.2, in which y refers to the environment of the x-system.
For a system in the state Ψ, ρΨ will denote the quantum equilibrium measure, ρΨ(dq) =
|Ψ(q)|2dq. If Z = F (Q) then ρZΨ denotes the measure induced by F , i.e. ρZΨ = ρΨ ◦ F−1.
2 Bohmian Experiments
According to Bohmian mechanics, the complete description or state of an N -particle system
is provided by its wave function Ψ(q, t), where q = (q1, . . . ,qN) ∈ R3N , and its configuration
Q = (Q1, . . . ,QN) ∈ R3N , where the Qk are the positions of the particles. The wave function,
which evolves according to Schro¨dinger’s equation,
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ , (2.1)
6
choreographs the motion of the particles: these evolve according to the equation
dQk
dt
=
~
mk
Im
Ψ∗∇kΨ
Ψ∗Ψ
(Q1, . . . ,QN) (2.2)
where ∇k = ∂/∂qk . In equation (2.1), H is the usual nonrelativistic Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian;
for spinless particles it is of the form
H = −
∑N
k=1
~
2
2mk
∇
2
k + V, (2.3)
containing as parameters the masses m1 . . . , mN of the particles as well as the potential energy
function V of the system. For an N -particle system of nonrelativistic particles, equations (2.1)
and (2.2) form a complete specification of the theory (magnetic fields1 and spin,2 as well as Fermi
and Bose-Einstein statistics,3 can easily be dealt with and in fact arise in a natural manner
[6, 15, 64, 42, 28]). There is no need, and indeed no room, for any further axioms, describing
either the behavior of other observables or the effects of measurement.
2.1 Equivariance and Quantum Equilibrium
It is important to bear in mind that regardless of which observable one chooses to measure, the
result of the measurement can be assumed to be given configurationally, say by some pointer
orientation or by a pattern of ink marks on a piece of paper. Then the fact that Bohmian
mechanics makes the same predictions as does orthodox quantum theory for the results of any
experiment—for example, a measurement of momentum or of a spin component—provided we
assume a random distribution for the configuration of the system and apparatus at the beginning
of the experiment given by |Ψ(q)|2—is a more or less immediate consequence of (2.2). This is
because of the quantum continuity equation
∂|Ψ|2
∂t
+ div JΨ = 0,
which is a simple consequence of Schro¨dinger’s equation. Here JΨ = (JΨ1 , . . . ,J
Ψ
N) with
JΨk =
~
mk
Im (Ψ∗∇kΨ)
the quantum probability current. This equation becomes the classical continuity equation
∂ρ
∂t
+ div ρ v = 0 (2.4)
for the system of equations dQ/dt = v defined by (2.2)—governing the evolution of the probability
density ρ under the motion defined by the guiding equation (2.2) for the particular choice ρ =
1When a magnetic field is present, the gradients ∇k in the equations (2.1 and (2.2) must be understood as
the covariant derivatives involving the vector potential A.
2See Section 2.5.
3For indistinguishable particles, a careful analysis [28] of the natural configuration space, which is no longer
R3N , leads to the consideration of wave functions on R3N that are either symmetric or antisymmetric under
permutations.
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|Ψ|2 = Ψ∗Ψ. In other words, if the probability density for the configuration satisfies ρ(q, t0) =
|Ψ(q, t0)|2 at some time t0, then the density to which this is carried by the motion (2.2) at any
time t is also given by ρ(q, t) = |Ψ(q, t)|2. This is an extremely important property of any
Bohmian system, as it expresses a certain compatibility between the two equations of motion
defining the dynamics, which we call the equivariance4 of |Ψ|2.
The above assumption guaranteeing agreement between Bohmian mechanics and quantum
mechanics regarding the results of any experiment is what we call the “quantum equilibrium
hypothesis”:
When a system has wave function Ψ its configuration Q is random with probability
distribution given by the measure ρΨ(dq) = |Ψ(q)|2dq. (2.5)
When this condition is satisfied we shall say that the system is in quantum equilibrium and we
shall call ρΨ the quantum equilibrium distribution. While the meaning and justification of (2.5)
is a delicate matter, which we have discussed at length elsewhere [25], it is important to recognize
that, merely as a consequence of (2.2) and (2.5), Bohmian mechanics is a counterexample to all
of the claims to the effect that a deterministic theory cannot account for quantum randomness
in the familiar statistical mechanical way, as arising from averaging over ignorance: Bohmian
mechanics is clearly a deterministic theory, and, as we have just explained, it does account for
quantum randomness as arising from averaging over ignorance given by |Ψ(q)|2.
2.2 Conditional and Effective Wave Functions
Which systems should be governed by Bohmian mechanics? An n-particle subsystem of an N -
particle system (n < N) need not in general be governed by Bohmian mechanics, since no wave
function for the subsystem need exist. This will be so even with trivial interaction potential V ,
if the wave function of the system does not properly factorize; for nontrivial V the Schro¨dinger
evolution would in any case quickly destroy such a factorization. Therefore in a universe governed
by Bohmian mechanics there is a priori only one wave function, namely that of the universe, and
there is a priori only one system governed by Bohmian mechanics, namely the universe itself.
Consider then an N -particle non relativistic universe governed by Bohmian mechanics, with
(universal) wave function Ψ. Focus on a subsystem with configuration variables x, i.e., on a
splitting q = (x, y) where y represents the configuration of the environment of the x-system. The
actual particle configurations at time t are accordingly denoted by Xt and Yt, i.e., Qt = (Xt, Yt).
Note that Ψt = Ψt(x, y). How can one assign a wave function to the x-system? One obvious
possibility—afforded by the existence of the actual configuration—is given by what we call the
4 Equivariance can be formulated in very general terms: consider the transformations U : Ψ → UΨ and
f : Q → f(Q), where U is a unitary transformation on L2(dq) and f is a transformation on configuration space
that may depend on Ψ. We say that the map Ψ 7→ µΨ from wave functions to measures on configuration space is
equivariant with respect to U and f if µUΨ = µΨ ◦ f−1. The above argument based on the continuity equation
(2.4) shows that Ψ 7→ |Ψ|2dq is equivariant with respect to U ≡ Ut = e−i t~ H , where H is the Schro¨dinger
Hamiltonian (2.3) and f ≡ ft is the solution map of (2.2). In this regard, it is important to observe that for a
Hamiltonian H which is not of Schro¨dinger type we shouldn’t expect (2.2) to be the appropriate velocity field, that
is, a field which generates an evolution in configuration space having |Ψ|2 as equivariant density. For example,
for H = c~
i
∂
∂q
, where c is a constant (for simplicity we are assuming configuration space to be one-dimensional),
we have that |Ψ|2 is equivariant provided the evolution of configurations is given by dQ/dt = c. In other words,
for Ut = e
ct ∂
∂q the map Ψ 7→ |Ψ|2dq is equivariant if ft : Q→ Q+ ct.
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conditional wave function of the x-system
ψt(x) = Ψt(x, Yt). (2.6)
To get familiar with this notion consider a very simple one dimensional universe made of two
particles with Hamiltonian (~ = 1)
H = H(x) +H(y) +H(xy) = −1
2
( ∂2
∂x2
+
∂2
∂y2
)
+
1
2
(x− y)2.
and initial wave function
Ψ0 = ψ ⊗ Φ0 with ψ(x) = pi− 14 e−x
2
2 and Φ0(y) = pi
− 1
4e−
y2
2 .
Then (2.1) and (2.2) are easily solved:
Ψt(x, y) = pi
− 1
2 (1 + it)−
1
2 e−
1
4
[
(x−y)2+ (x+y)
2
1+2it
]
,
Xt = a(t)X + b(t)Y and Yt = b(t)X + a(t)Y,
where a(t) = 1
2
[(1+ t2)
1
2 +1], b(t) = 1
2
[(1+ t2)
1
2 − 1], and X and Y are the initial positions of the
two particles. Focus now on one of the two particles (the x-system) and regard the other one as
its environment (the y-system). The conditional wave function of the x-system
ψt(x) = pi
− 1
2 (1 + it)−
1
2 e−
1
4
[
(x−Yt)2+
(x+Yt)
2
1+2it
]
,
depends, through Yt, on both the initial condition Y for the environment and the initial condition
X for the particle. As these are random, so is the evolution of ψt, with probability law determined
by |Ψ0|2. In particular, ψt does not satisfy Schro¨dinger’s equation for any H(x).
We remark that even when the x-system is dynamically decoupled from its environment, its
conditional wave function will not in general evolve according to Schro¨dinger’s equation. Thus
the conditional wave function lacks the dynamical implications from which the wave function of
a system derives much of its physical significance. These are, however, captured by the notion of
effective wave function:
Suppose that Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)Φ(y) + Ψ⊥(x, y) , where Φ and Ψ⊥ have macroscop-
ically disjoint y-supports. If Y ∈ supp Φ we say that ψ is the effective wave
function of the x-system.
(2.7)
Of course, ψ is also the conditional wave function since nonvanishing scalar multiples of wave
functions are naturally identified.5
5Note that in Bohmian mechanics the wave function is naturally a projective object since wave functions
differing by a multiplicative constant—possibly time-dependent—are associated with the same vector field, and
thus generate the same dynamics.
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2.3 Decoherence
One might wonder why systems possess an effective wave function at all. In fact, in general they
don’t! For example the x-system will not have an effective wave function when, for instance,
it belongs to a larger microscopic system whose effective wave function doesn’t factorize in the
appropriate way. However, the larger the environment of the x-system, the greater is the potential
for the existence of an effective wave function for this system, owing in effect to the abundance
of “measurement-like” interaction with a larger environment.6
We remark that it is the relative stability of the macroscopic disjointness employed in the
definition of the effective wave function, arising from what are nowadays often called mechanisms
of decoherence—the destruction of the coherent spreading of the wave function, the effectively
irreversible flow of “phase information” into the (macroscopic) environment—which accounts
for the fact that the effective wave function of a system obeys Schro¨dinger’s equation for the
system alone whenever this system is isolated. One of the best descriptions of the mechanisms of
decoherence, though not the word itself, can be found in Bohm’s 1952 “hidden variables” paper
[15].
Decoherence plays a crucial role in the very formulation of the various interpretations of
quantum theory loosely called decoherence theories(Griffiths [46], Omne`s [65], Leggett [60], Zurek
[79], Joos and Zeh [51], Gell-Mann and Hartle [35]). In this regard we wish to emphasize, however,
as did Bell in his article “Against Measurement” [11], that decoherence in no way comes to grips
with the measurement problem itself, being arguably a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient,
condition for its complete resolution. In contrast, for Bohmian mechanics decoherence is purely
phenomenological—it plays no role whatsoever in the formulation (or interpretation) of the theory
itself7—and the very notion of effective wave function accounts at once for the reduction of the
wave packet in quantum measurement.
According to orthodox quantum measurement theory [74, 14, 76, 77], after a measurement,
or preparation, has been performed on a quantum system, the x-system, the wave function for
the composite formed by system and apparatus is of the form∑
α
ψα ⊗ Φα (2.8)
with the different Φα supported by the macroscopically distinct (sets of) configurations corre-
sponding to the various possible outcomes of the measurement, e.g., given by apparatus pointer
orientations. Of course, for Bohmian mechanics the terms of (2.8) are not all on the same
footing: one of them, and only one, is selected, or more precisely supported, by the outcome—
corresponding, say, to α0—which actually occurs. To emphasize this we may write (2.8) in the
6To understand how this comes about one may suppose that initially the y-supports of Φ and Ψ⊥ (cf. the
definition above of effective wave function) are just “sufficiently” (but not macroscopically) disjoint. Then, due
to the interaction with the environment, the amount of y-disjointness will tend to increase dramatically as time
goes on, with, as in a chain reaction, more and more degrees of freedom participating in this disjointness. When
the effect of this “decoherence” is taken into account, one finds that even a small amount of y-disjointness will
often tend to become “sufficient,” and quickly “more than sufficient,” and finally macroscopic.
7However, decoherence plays an important role in the emergence of Newtonian mechanics as the description of
the macroscopic regime for Bohmian mechanics, supporting a picture of a macroscopic Bohmian particle, in the
classical regime, guided by a macroscopically well-localized wave packet with a macroscopically sharp momentum
moving along a classical trajectory. It may, indeed, seem somewhat ironic that the gross features of our world
should appear classical because of interaction with the environment and the resulting wave function entanglement,
the characteristic quantum innovation.
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form
ψ ⊗ Φ +Ψ⊥
where ψ = ψα0 , Φ = Φα0 , and Ψ
⊥ =
∑
α6=α0
ψα ⊗ Φα. By comparison with (2.7) it follows that
after the measurement the x-system has effective wave function ψα0 . This is how collapse (or
reduction) of the effective wave function to the one associated with the outcome α0 arises in
Bohmian mechanics.
While in orthodox quantum theory the “collapse” is merely superimposed upon the unitary
evolution—without a precise specification of the circumstances under which it may legitimately
be invoked—we have now, in Bohmian mechanics, that the evolution of the effective wave function
is actually given by a stochastic process, which consistently embodies both unitarity and collapse
as appropriate. In particular, the effective wave function of a subsystem evolves according to
Schro¨dinger’s equation when this system is suitably isolated. Otherwise it “pops in and out”
of existence in a random fashion, in a way determined by the continuous (but still random)
evolution of the conditional wave function ψt. Moreover, it is the critical dependence on the
state of the environment and the initial conditions which is responsible for the random behavior
of the (conditional or effective) wave function of the system.
2.4 Wave Function and State
As an important consequence of (2.6) we have, for the conditional probability distribution of
the configuration Xt of a system at time t, given the configuration Yt of its environment, the
fundamental conditional probability formula [25]:
ProbΨ0
(
Xt ∈ dx
∣∣ Yt) = |ψt(x)|2 dx, (2.9)
where
ProbΨ0(dQ) = |Ψ0(Q)|2 dQ,
with Q = (X, Y ) the configuration of the universe at the (initial) time t = 0. Formula (2.9) is
the cornerstone of our analysis [25] on the origin of randomness in Bohmian mechanics. Since
the right hand side of (2.9) involves only the effective wave function, it follows that the wave
function ψt of a subsystem represents maximal information about its configuration Xt. In other
words, given the fact that its wave function is ψt, it is in principle impossible to know more about
the configuration of a system than what is expressed by the right hand side of (2.9), even when
the detailed configuration Yt of its environment is taken into account [25]
ProbΨ0
(
Xt ∈ dx
∣∣ Yt) = ProbΨ0(Xt ∈ dx ∣∣ ψt) = |ψt(x)|2 dx. (2.10)
The fact that the knowledge of the configuration of a system must be mediated by its wave
function may partially account for the possibility of identifying the state of a system—its com-
plete description—with its wave function without encountering any practical difficulties. This is
primarily because of the wave function’s statistical role, but its dynamical role is also relevant
here. Thus it is natural, even in Bohmian mechanics, to regard the wave function as the “state”
of the system. This attitude is supported by the asymmetric roles of configuration and wave
function: while the fact that the wave function is ψ entails that the configuration is distributed
according to |ψ|2, the fact that the configuration is X has no implications whatsoever for the
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wave function.8 Indeed, such an asymmetry is grounded in the dynamical laws and in the initial
conditions. ψ is always assumed to be fixed, being usually under experimental control, while X
is always taken as random, according to the quantum equilibrium distribution.
When all is said and done, it is important to bear in mind that regarding ψ as the “state”
is only of practical value, and shouldn’t obscure the more important fact that the most de-
tailed description—the complete state description—is given (in Bohmian mechanics) by the wave
function and the configuration.
2.5 The Stern-Gerlach Experiment
Information about a system does not spontaneously pop into our heads or into our (other)
“measuring” instruments; rather, it is generated by an experiment : some physical interaction
between the system of interest and these instruments, which together (if there is more than one)
comprise the apparatus for the experiment. Moreover, this interaction is defined by, and must
be analyzed in terms of, the physical theory governing the behavior of the composite formed
by system and apparatus. If the apparatus is well designed, the experiment should somehow
convey significant information about the system. However, we cannot hope to understand the
significance of this “information”—for example, the nature of what it is, if anything, that has
been measured—without some such theoretical analysis.
As an illustration of such an analysis we shall discuss the Stern-Gerlach experiment from
the standpoint of Bohmian mechanics. But first we must explain how spin is incorporated into
Bohmian mechanics: If Ψ is spinor-valued, the bilinear forms appearing in the numerator and
denominator of (2.2) should be understood as spinor-inner-products; e.g., for a single spin 1
2
particle the two-component wave function
Ψ ≡
(
Ψ+(x)
Ψ−(x)
)
generates the velocity
vΨ =
~
m
Im
(Ψ,∇Ψ)
(Ψ,Ψ)
(2.11)
where ( · , · ) denotes the scalar product in the spin space C2. The wave function evolves via
(2.1), where now the Hamiltonian H contains the Pauli term, for a single particle proportional
to B ·σ, that represents the coupling between the “spin” and an external magnetic field B; here
σ = (σx, σy, σz) are the Pauli spin matrices which can be taken to be
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
Let’s now focus on a Stern-Gerlach “measurement of the operator σz”: An inhomogeneous
magnetic fieldB is established in a neighborhood of the origin, by means of a suitable arrangement
of magnets. This magnetic field is oriented in the positive z-direction, and is increasing in this
direction. We also assume that the arrangement is invariant under translations in the x-direction,
i.e., that the geometry does not depend upon x-coordinate. A particle with a fairly definite
8The “fact” (that the configuration is X) shouldn’t be confused with the “knowledge of the fact”: the latter
does have such implications [25]!
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momentum is directed towards the origin along the negative y-axis. For simplicity, we shall
consider a neutral spin-1/2 particle whose wave function Ψ evolves according to the Hamiltonian
H = − ~
2
2m
∇
2 − µσ·B. (2.12)
where µ is a positive constant (if one wishes, one might think of a fictitious electron not feeling
the Lorentz force).
The inhomogeneous field generates a vertical deflection of Ψ away from the y-axis, which for
Bohmian mechanics leads to a similar deflection of the particle trajectory according to the velocity
field defined by (2.11): if its wave function Ψ were initially an eigenstate of σz of eigenvalue 1 or
−1, i.e., if it were of the form
Ψ(+) = ψ(+) ⊗ Φ0(x) or Ψ(−) = ψ(−) ⊗ Φ0(x)
where
ψ(+) ≡
(
1
0
)
and ψ(−) ≡
(
0
1
)
(2.13)
then the deflection would be in the positive (negative) z-direction (by a rather definite angle).
This limiting behavior is readily seen for Φ0 = Φ0(z)φ(x, y) and B = (0, 0, B), so that the z-
motion is completely decoupled from the motion along the other two directions, and by making
the standard (albeit unphysical) assumption [13], [14]
∂B
∂z
= const > 0 . (2.14)
whence
µσ·B = (b+ az)σz
where a > 0 and b are constants. Then
Ψ
(+)
t =
(
Φ
(+)
t (z)φt(x, y)
0
)
and Ψ
(−)
t =
(
0
Φ
(−)
t (z)φt(x, y)
)
where Φ
(±)
t are the solutions of
i~
∂Φt
(±)
∂t
= − ~
2
2m
∂2Φt
(±)
∂z2
∓ (b+ a z)Φt(±), (2.15)
for initial conditions Φ0
(±) = Φ0(z). Since z generates translations of the z-component of the
momentum, the behavior described above follows easily. More explicitly, the limiting behavior
for t → ∞ readily follows by a stationary phase argument on the explicit solution9 of (2.15).
9Eq. (2.15) is readily solved:
Φ
(±)
t (z) =
∫
G(±)(z, z′; t)Φ0(z
′) dz′ ,
where (by the standard rules for the Green’s function of linear and quadratic Hamiltonians)
G(±)(z, z′; t) =
√
m
2pii~t
e
i
~
(
m
2t
(
z−z′−(±) at
2
m
)2
+ (±)at2
(
z−z′−(±) at
2
m
)
−(±)(az′+b)t+ at
3
3m
)
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More simply, we may consider the initial Gaussian state
Φ0 =
e(−
z2
4d2
)
(2d2pi)
1
4
for which |Φ±t (z)|2, the probability density of the particle being at a point of z-coordinate z, is,
by the linearity of the interaction in (2.15), a Gaussian with mean and mean square deviation
given respectively by
z¯(t) = (±)a t
2
2m
d(t) = d
√
1 +
~2t2
2m2d4
. (2.16)
For a more general initial wave function,
Ψ = ψ ⊗ Φ0 ψ = αψ(+) + βψ(−) (2.17)
passage through the magnetic field will, by linearity, split the wave function into an upward-
deflected piece (proportional to ψ(+)) and a downward-deflected piece (proportional to ψ(−)),
with corresponding deflections of the trajectories. The outcome is registered by detectors placed
in the paths of these two possible “beams.” Thus of the four kinematically possible outcomes
(“pointer orientations”) the occurrence of no detection and of simultaneous detection can be
ignored as highly unlikely, and the two relevant outcomes correspond to registration by either
the upper or the lower detector. Accordingly, for a measurement of σz the experiment is equipped
with a “calibration” (i.e., an assignment of numerical values to the outcomes of the experiment)
λ+ = 1 for upper detection and λ− = −1 for lower detection (while for a measurement of the
z-component of the spin angular momentum itself the calibration is given by 1
2
~λ±).
Note that one can completely understand what’s going on in this Stern-Gerlach experiment
without invoking any putative property of the electron such as its actual z-component of spin
that is supposed to be revealed in the experiment. For a general initial wave function there is
no such property. What is more, the transparency of the analysis of this experiment makes it
clear that there is nothing the least bit remarkable (or for that matter “nonclassical”) about
the nonexistence of this property. But the failure to pay attention to the role of operators
as observables, i.e., to precisely what we should mean when we speak of measuring operator-
observables, helps create a false impression of quantum peculiarity.
2.6 A Remark on the Reality of Spin in Bohmian Mechanics
Bell has said that (for Bohmian mechanics) spin is not real. Perhaps he should better have
said: “Even spin is not real,” not merely because of all observables, it is spin which is generally
regarded as quantum mechanically most paradigmatic, but also because spin is treated in ortho-
dox quantum theory very much like position, as a “degree of freedom”—a discrete index which
supplements the continuous degrees of freedom corresponding to position—in the wave function.
Be that as it may, his basic meaning is, we believe, this: Unlike position, spin is not primitive,
i.e., no actual discrete degrees of freedom, analogous to the actual positions of the particles, are
added to the state description in order to deal with “particles with spin.” Roughly speaking, spin
is merely in the wave function. At the same time, as explained in Section 2.5, “spin measure-
ments” are completely clear, and merely reflect the way spinor wave functions are incorporated
into a description of the motion of configurations.
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In this regard, it might be objected that while spin may not be primitive, so that the result of
our “spin measurement” will not reflect any initial primitive property of the system, nonetheless
this result is determined by the initial configuration of the system, i.e., by the position of our
electron, together with its initial wave function, and as such—as a function Xσz(q, ψ) of the state
of the system—it is some property of the system and in particular it is surely real. We shall
address this issue in Sections 8.3 and 8.4.
2.7 The Framework of Discrete Experiments
We shall now consider a generic experiment. Whatever its significance, the information conveyed
by the experiment is registered in the apparatus as an output, represented, say, by the orientation
of a pointer. Moreover, when we speak of a generic experiment, we have in mind a fairly definite
initial state of the apparatus, the ready state Φ0 = Φ0(y), one for which the apparatus should
function as intended, and in particular one in which the pointer has some “null” orientation, as
well as a definite initial state of the system ψ = ψ(x) on which the experiment is performed.
Under these conditions it turns out [25] that the initial t = 0 wave function Ψ0 = Ψ0(q) of the
composite system formed by system and apparatus, with generic configuration q = (x, y), has a
product form, i.e.,
Ψ0 = ψ ⊗ Φ0.
Such a product form is an expression of the independence of system and apparatus immediately
before the experiment begins.10
For Bohmian mechanics we should expect in general, as a consequence of the quantum equi-
librium hypothesis, that the outcome of the experiment—the final pointer orientation—will be
random: Even if the system and apparatus initially have definite, known wave functions, so that
the outcome is determined by the initial configuration of system and apparatus, this configu-
ration is random, since the composite system is in quantum equilibrium, and the distribution
of the final configuration is given by |ΨT (x, y)|2, where ΨT is the wave function of the system-
apparatus composite at the time t = T when the experiment ends, and x, respectively y, is the
generic system, respectively apparatus, configuration.
Suppose now that ΨT has the form (2.8), which roughly corresponds to assuming that the
experiment admits, i.e., that the apparatus is so designed that there is, only a finite (or countable)
set of possible outcomes, given, say, by the different possible macroscopically distinct pointer
orientations of the apparatus and corresponding to a partition of the apparatus configuration
space into macroscopically disjoint regions Gα, α = 1, 2, . . ..
11 We arrive in this way at the
notion of discrete experiment, for which the time evolution arising from the interaction of the
system and apparatus from t = 0 to t = T is given by the unitary map
U : H⊗ Φ0 →
⊕
α
H⊗ Φα , ψ ⊗ Φ0 7→ ΨT =
∑
α
ψα ⊗ Φα (2.18)
where H is the system Hilbert space of square-integrable wave functions with the usual inner
10It might be argued that it is somewhat unrealistic to assume a sharp preparation of ψ, as well as the possibility
of resetting the apparatus always in the same initial state Φ0. We shall address this issue in Section 6
11Note that to assume there are only finitely, or countably, many outcomes is really no assumption at all, since
the outcome should ultimately be converted to digital form, whatever its initial representation may be.
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product
〈ψ, φ〉 =
∫
ψ∗(x)φ(x) dx.
and the Φα are a fixed set of (normalized) apparatus states supported by the macroscopically
distinct regions Gα of apparatus configurations.
The experiment usually comes equipped with an assignment of numerical values λα (or a
vector of such values) to the various outcomes α. This assignment is defined by a “calibration”
function F on the apparatus configuration space assuming on each region Gα the constant value
λα. If for simplicity we assume that these values are in one-to-one correspondence with the
outcomes12 then
pα =
∫
F−1(λα)
|ΨT (x, y)|2dx dy =
∫
Gα
|ΨT (x, y)|2dx dy (2.19)
is the probability of finding λα, for initial system wave function ψ. Since Φα′(y) = 0 for y ∈ Gα
unless α = α′, we obtain
pα =
∫
dx
∫
Gα
|
∑
α′
ψα′(x)Φα′(y)|2 dy =
∫
|ψα(x)|2dx = ‖ψα‖2. (2.20)
Note that when the result λα is obtained, the effective wave function of the system undergoes
the transformation ψ → ψα.
A simple example of a discrete experiment is provided by the map
U : ψ ⊗ Φ0 7→
∑
α
cαψ ⊗ Φα, (2.21)
where the cα are complex numbers such that
∑
α |cα|2 = 1; then pα = |cα|2. Note that the
experiment defined by (2.21) resembles a coin-flip more than a measurement since the outcome
α occurs with a probability independent of ψ.
2.8 Reproducibility and its Consequences
Though for a generic discrete experiment there is no reason to expect the sort of “measurement-
like” behavior typical of familiar quantum measurements, there are, however, special experiments
whose outcomes are somewhat less random than we might have thought possible. According to
Schro¨dinger [72]:
The systematically arranged interaction of two systems (measuring object and mea-
suring instrument) is called a measurement on the first system, if a directly-sensible
variable feature of the second (pointer position) is always reproduced within certain
error limits when the process is immediately repeated (on the same object, which in
the mean time must not be exposed to additional influences).
To implement the notion of “measurement-like” experiment considered by Schro¨dinger, we
first make some preliminary observations concerning the unitary map (2.18). Let P[Φα] be the
12We shall consider the more general case later on in Subsection 3.2.4.
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orthogonal projection in the Hilbert space
⊕
αH⊗Φα onto the subspace H⊗Φα and let H˜α be
the subspaces of H defined by
P[Φα] [U(H⊗ Φ0)] = H˜α ⊗ Φα . (2.22)
(Since the vectors in H˜α arise from projecting ΨT =
∑
α ψα ⊗ Φα onto its α-component, H˜α is
the space of the “collapsed” wave functions associated with the occurrence of the outcome α.)
Then
U(H⊗ Φ0) ⊆
⊕
α
H˜α ⊗ Φα. (2.23)
Note, however, that it need not be the case that U(H ⊗ Φ0) =
⊕
α H˜α ⊗ Φα, and that the
spaces H˜α need be neither orthogonal nor distinct; e.g., for (2.21) H˜α = H and U(H ⊗ Φ0) =
H⊗∑α cαΦα 6=⊕αH⊗ Φα.13
A “measurement-like” experiment is one which is reproducible in the sense that it will yield
the same outcome as originally obtained if it is immediately repeated. (This means in particular
that the apparatus must be immediately reset to its ready state, or a fresh apparatus must
be employed, while the system is not tampered with so that its initial state for the repeated
experiment is its final state produced by the first experiment.) Thus the experiment is reproducible
if
U(H˜α ⊗ Φ0) ⊆ H˜α ⊗ Φα (2.24)
or, equivalently, if there are spaces Hα′ ⊆ H˜α such that
U(H˜α ⊗ Φ0) = Hα′ ⊗ Φα . (2.25)
Note that it follows from the unitarity of U and the orthogonality of the subspaces H˜α ⊗ Φα
that the subspaces H˜α ⊗ Φ0 and hence the H˜α are also orthogonal. Therefore, by taking the
orthogonal sum over α of both sides of (2.25), we obtain
⊕
α
U(H˜α ⊗ Φ0) = U
(⊕
α
H˜α ⊗ Φ0
)
=
⊕
α
Hα′ ⊗ Φα. (2.26)
If we now make the simplifying assumption that the subspaces H˜α are finite dimensional, we have
from unitarity that H˜α = Hα′, and thus, by comparing (2.23) and (2.26), that equality holds in
(2.23) and that
H =
⊕
α
Hα (2.27)
with
U(Hα ⊗ Φ0) = Hα ⊗ Φα (2.28)
for
Hα ≡ H˜α = Hα′ .
13Note that if H has finite dimension n, and the number of outcomes α is m, dim [U(H ⊗ Φ0)] = n, while
dim [
⊕
αH⊗ Φα] = n ·m.
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Therefore if the wave function of the system is initially in Hα, outcome α definitely occurs and
the value λα is thus definitely obtained (assuming again for simplicity one-to-one correspondence
between outcomes and results). It then follows that for a general initial system wave function
ψ =
∑
α
PHαψ,
where PHα is the projection in H onto the subspace Hα, that the outcome α, with result λα, is
obtained with (the usual) probability
pα = ‖PHαψ‖2 = 〈ψ, PHαψ〉, (2.29)
which follows from (2.28), (2.20), and (2.18) since U
(
PHαψ⊗Φ0
)
= ψα⊗Φα and hence ‖PHαψ‖ =
‖ψα‖ by unitarity. In particular, when the λα are real-valued, the expected value obtained is∑
α
pαλα =
∑
α
λα‖PHαψ‖2 = 〈ψ,Aψ〉 (2.30)
where
A =
∑
α
λαPHα (2.31)
is the self-adjoint operator with eigenvalues λα and spectral projections PHα.
2.9 Operators as Observables
What we wish to emphasize here is that, insofar as the statistics for the values which result from
the experiment are concerned,
the relevant data for the experiment are the collection {Hα} of special orthogonal
subspaces, together with the corresponding calibration {λα},
(2.32)
and this data is compactly expressed and represented by the self-adjoint operator A, on the system
Hilbert space H, given by (2.31). Thus, under the assumptions we have made, with a reproducible
experiment E we naturally associate an operator A = A
E
, a single mathematical object, defined
on the system alone, in terms of which an efficient description (2.29) of the statistics of the
possible results is achieved; we shall denote this association by
E 7→ A . (2.33)
If we wish we may speak of “operators as observables,” and when an experiment E is associated
with a self-adjoint operator A, as described above, we may say that the experiment E is a
“measurement” of the observable represented by the self-adjoint operator A. If we do so, however,
it is important that we appreciate that in so speaking we merely refer to what we have just
derived: the role of operators in the description of certain experiments.14
So understood, the notion of operator-as-observable in no way implies that anything is gen-
uinely measured in the experiment, and certainly not the operator itself! In a general experiment
14Operators as observables also naturally convey information about the system’s wave function after the exper-
iment. For example, for an ideal measurement, when the outcome is α the wave function of the system after the
experiment is (proportional to) PHαψ. We shall elaborate upon this in the next section.
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no system property is being measured, even if the experiment happens to be measurement-like.
(Position measurements in Bohmian mechanics are of course an important exception.) What in
general is going on in obtaining outcome α is completely straightforward and in no way suggests,
or assigns any substantive meaning to, statements to the effect that, prior to the experiment,
observable A somehow had a value λα—whether this be in some determinate sense or in the
sense of Heisenberg’s “potentiality” or some other ill-defined fuzzy sense—which is revealed, or
crystallized, by the experiment. Even speaking of the observable A as having value λα when
the system’s wave function is in Hα, i.e., when this wave function is an eigenstate of A of eigen-
value λα—insofar as it suggests that something peculiarly quantum is going on when the wave
function is not an eigenstate whereas in fact there is nothing the least bit peculiar about the
situation—perhaps does more harm than good.
It might be objected that we are claiming to arrive at the quantum formalism under some-
what unrealistic assumptions, such as, for example, reproducibility or finite dimensionality. We
agree. But this objection misses the point of the exercise. The quantum formalism itself is an
idealization; when applicable at all, it is only as an approximation. Beyond illuminating the role
of operators as ingredients in this formalism, our point was to indicate how naturally it emerges.
In this regard we must emphasize that the following question arises for quantum orthodoxy, but
does not arise for Bohmian mechanics: For precisely which theory is the quantum formalism an
idealization?
We shall discuss how to go beyond the idealization involved in the quantum formalism in
Section 4—after having analyzed it thoroughly in Section 3. First we wish to show that many
more experiments than those satisfying our assumptions can indeed be associated with operators
in exactly the manner we have described.
2.10 The General Framework of Bohmian Experiments
According to (2.19) the statistics of the results of a discrete experiment are governed by the
probability measure ρΨT ◦F−1, where ρΨT (dq) = |ΨT (q)|2dq is the quantum equilibrium measure.
Note that discreteness of the value space of F plays no role in the characterization of this
measure. This suggests that we may consider a more general notion of experiment, not based
on the assumption of a countable set of outcomes, but only on the unitarity of the operator U ,
which transforms the initial state ψ ⊗ Φ0 into the final state ΨT , and on a generic calibration
function F from the configuration space of the composite system to some value space, e.g., R,
or Rm, giving the result of the experiment as a function F (QT ) of the final configuration QT of
system and apparatus. We arrive in this way at the notion of general experiment
E ≡ {Φ0, U, F}, (2.34)
where the unitary U embodies the interaction of system and apparatus and the function F could
be completely general. Of course, for application to the results of real-world experiments F might
represent the “orientation of the apparatus pointer” or some coarse-graining thereof.
Performing E on a system with initial wave function ψ leads to the result Z = F (QT ) and since
QT is randomly distributed according to the quantum equilibrium measure ρΨT , the probability
distribution of Z is given by the induced measure
ρZψ = ρΨT ◦ F−1 . (2.35)
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(We have made explicit only the dependence of the measure on ψ, since the initial apparatus
state Φ0 is of course fixed, defined by the experiment E .) Note that this more general notion of
experiment eliminates the slight vagueness arising from the imprecise notion of macroscopic upon
which the notion of discrete experiment is based. Note also that the structure (2.34) conveys
information about the wave function (2.6) of the system after a certain result F (QT ) is obtained.
Note, however, that this somewhat formal notion of experiment may not contain enough
information to determine the detailed Bohmian dynamics, which would require specification
of the Hamiltonian of the system-apparatus composite, that might not be captured by U . In
particular, the final configuration QT may not be determined, for given initial wave function, as
a function of the initial configuration of system and apparatus. E does, however, determine what
is relevant for our purposes about the random variable QT , namely its distribution, and hence
that of Z = F (QT ).
Let us now focus on the right had side of the equation (2.29), which establishes the association
of operators with experiments: 〈ψ, PHαψ〉 is the probability that “the operator A has value λα”,
and according to standard quantum mechanics the statistics of the results of measuring a general
self-adjoint operator A, not necessarily with pure point spectrum, in the (normalized) state ψ
are described by the probability measure
∆ 7→ µAψ(∆) ≡ 〈ψ, PA(∆)ψ〉 (2.36)
where ∆ is a (Borel) set of real numbers and PA : ∆ 7→ PA(∆) is the projection-valued-measure
(PVM) uniquely associated with A by the spectral theorem. (We recall [70] that a PVM is
a normalized, countably additive set function whose values are, instead of nonnegative reals,
orthogonal projections on a Hilbert spaceH. Any PVM P onH determines, for any given ψ ∈ H,
a probability measure µψ ≡ µPψ : ∆ 7→ 〈ψ, P (∆)ψ〉 on R. Integration against projection-valued-
measure is analogous to integration against ordinary measures, so that B ≡ ∫ f(λ)P (dλ) is well-
defined, as an operator on H. Moreover, by the spectral theorem every self-adjoint operator A is
of the form A =
∫
λP (dλ), for a unique projection-valued-measure P = PA, and
∫
f(λ)P (dλ) =
f(A). )
It is then rather clear how (2.33) extends to general self-adjoint operators: a general exper-
iment E is a measurement of the self-adjoint operator A if the statistics of the results of E are
given by (2.36), i.e.,
E 7→ A if and only if ρZψ = µAψ . (2.37)
In particular, if E 7→ A, then the moments of the result of E are the moments of A:
< Zn >=
∫
λn〈ψ, P (dλ)ψ〉 = 〈ψ,Anψ〉.
3 The Quantum Formalism
The spirit of this section will be rather different from that of the previous one. Here the focus
will be on the formal structure of experiments measuring self-adjoint operators. Our aim is to
show that the standard quantum formalism emerges from a formal analysis of the association
E 7→ A between operator and experiment provided by (2.37). By “formal analysis” we mean not
only that the detailed physical conditions under which might E 7→ A hold (e.g., reproducibility)
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will play no role, but also that the practical requirement that E be physically realizable will be
of no relevance whatsoever.
Note that such a formal approach is unavoidable in order to recover the quantum formalism.
In fact, within the quantum formalism one may consider measurements of arbitrary self-adjoint
operators, for example, the operator A = Xˆ2Pˆ + PˆX2, where Xˆ and Pˆ are respectively the
position and the momentum operators. However, it may very well be the case that no “real
world” experiment measuring A exists. Thus, in order to allow for measurements of arbitrary self-
adjoint operators we shall regard (2.34) as characterizing an “abstract experiment”; in particular,
we shall not regard the unitary map U as arising necessarily from a (realizable) Schro¨dinger time
evolution. We may also speak of virtual experiments.
In this regard one should observe that to resort to a formal analysis is indeed quite common
in physics. Consider, e.g., the Hamiltonian formulation of classical mechanics that arose from an
abstraction of the physical description of the world provided by Newtonian mechanics. Here we
may freely speak of completely general Hamiltonians, e.g. H(p, q) = p6, without being concerned
about whether they are physical or not. Indeed, only very few Hamiltonians correspond to
physically realizable motions!
A warning: As we have stressed in the introduction and in Section 2.9, when we speak here
of a measurement we don’t usually mean a genuine measurement—an experiment revealing the
pre-existing value of a quantity of interest, the measured quantity or property. (We speak in this
unfortunate way because it is standard.) Genuine measurement will be discussed much later, in
Section 7.
3.1 Weak Formal Measurements
The first formal notion we shall consider is that of weak formal measurement, formalizing the
relevant data of an experiment measuring a self-adjoint operator:
Any orthogonal decomposition H =⊕αHα, i.e., any complete collection {Hα} of
mutually orthogonal subspaces, paired with any set {λα} of distinct real numbers,
defines the weak formal measurement M≡ {(Hα, λα)} ≡ {Hα, λα}.
(3.1)
(Compare (3.1) with (2.32) and note that now we are not assuming that the spaces Hα are
finite-dimensional.) The notion of weak formal measurement is aimed at expressing the minimal
structure that all experiments (some or all of which might be virtual) measuring the same operator
A =
∑
λαPHα have in common (PHα is the orthogonal projection onto the subspace Hα). Then,
“to perform M” shall mean to perform (at least virtually) any one of these experiments, i.e.,
any experiment such that
pα = 〈ψ, PHαψ〉 (3.2)
is the probability of obtaining the result λα on a system initially in the state ψ. (This is of course
equivalent to requiring that the result λα is definitely obtained if and only if the initial wave
function ψ ∈ Hα.)
Given M≡ {Hα, λα} consider the set function
P : ∆ 7→ P (∆) ≡
∑
λα∈∆
PHα , (3.3)
where ∆ is a set of real numbers (technically, a Borel set). Then
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1) P is normalized, i.e., P (R) = I, where I is the identity operator and R is the real line,
2) P (∆) is an orthogonal projection, i.e., P (∆)2 = P (∆) = P (∆)∗,
3) P is countably additive, i.e., P (
⋃
n∆n) =
∑
n P (∆n), for ∆n disjoint sets.
Thus P is a projection-valued-measure and therefore the notion of weak formal measurement is
indeed equivalent to that of “discrete” PVM, that is, a PVM supported by a countable set {λα}
of values.
More general PVMs, e.g. PVMs supported by a continuous set of values, will arise if we
extend (3.1) and base the notion of weak formal measurement upon the general association
(2.37) between experiments and operators. If we stipulate that
any projection-valued-measure P on H defines a weak formal measurement M≡ P , (3.4)
then “to perform M” shall mean to perform any experiment E associated with A = ∫ λP (dλ)
in the sense of (2.37).
Note that since by the spectral theorem there is a natural one-to-one correspondence between
PVMs and self-adjoint operators, we may speak equivalently of the operator A = AM, for given
M, or of the weak formal M =MA, for given A. In particular, the weak formal measurement
MA represents the equivalence class of all experiments E → A.
3.2 Strong Formal Measurements
We wish now to classify the different experiments E associated with the same self-adjoint operator
A by taking into account the effect of E on the state of the system, i.e., the state transformations
ψ → ψα induced by the occurrence of the various results λα of E . Accordingly, unless otherwise
stated, from now on we shall assume E to be a discrete experiment measuring A =
∑
λαPHα ,
for which the state transformation ψ → ψα is defined by (2.18). This leads to the notion of
strong formal measurements. For the most important types of strong formal measurements,
ideal, normal and standard, there is a one-to-one correspondence between α’s and numerical
results λα.
3.2.1 Ideal Measurements
Given a weak formal measurement of A, the simplest possibility for the transition ψ → ψα is
that when the result λα is obtained, the initial state ψ is projected onto the corresponding space
Hα, i.e., that
ψ → ψα = PHαψ. (3.5)
This prescription defines uniquely the ideal measurement of A. (The transformation ψ → ψα
should be regarded as defined only in the projective sense: ψ → ψα and ψ → cψα (c 6= 0) should
be regarded as the same transition.) “To perform an ideal measurement of A” shall then mean
to perform a discrete experiment E whose results are statistically distributed according to (3.2)
and whose state transformations (2.18) are given by (3.5).
Under an ideal measurement the wave function changes as little as possible: an initial ψ ∈ Hα
is unchanged by the measurement. Ideal measurements have always played a privileged role in
quantum mechanics. It is the ideal measurements that are most frequently discussed in textbooks.
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It is for ideal measurements that the standard collapse rule is obeyed. When Dirac [23] wrote:
“a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable
that is being measured” he was referring to an ideal measurement.
3.2.2 Normal Measurements
The rigid structure of ideal measurements can be weakened by requiring only that Hα as a whole,
and not the individual vectors in Hα, is unchanged by the measurement and therefore that the
state transformations induced by the measurement are such that when the result λα is obtained
the transition
ψ → ψα = UαPHαψ (3.6)
occurs, where the Uα are operators on Hα ( Uα : Hα → Hα). Then for any such discrete
experiment E measuring A, the Uα can be chosen so that (3.6) agrees with (2.18), i.e., so that for
ψ ∈ Hα, U(ψ⊗Φ0) = Uαψ⊗Φα, and hence so that Uα is unitary (or at least a partial isometry).
Such a measurement, with unitaries Uα : Hα →Hα, will be called a normal measurement of A.
In contrast with an ideal measurement, a normal measurement of an operator is not uniquely
determined by the operator itself: additional information is needed to determine the transitions,
and this is provided by the family {Uα}. Different families define different normal measurements
of the same operator. Note that ideal measurements are, of course, normal (with Uα = Iα ≡ iden-
tity on Hα), and that normal measurements with one-dimensional subspaces Hα are necessarily
ideal.
Since the transformations (3.6) leave invariant the subspaces Hα, the notion of normal mea-
surement characterizes completely the class of reproducible measurements of self-adjoint oper-
ators. Following the terminology introduced by Pauli [66], normal measurement are sometimes
calledmeasurements of first kind . Normal measurements are also quantum non demolition (QND)
measurements [18], defined as measurements such that the operators describing the induced
state transformations, i.e, the operators Rα ≡ UαPHα, commute with the measured operator
A =
∑
λαPHα. (This condition is regarded as expressing that the measurement leaves the mea-
sured observable A unperturbed).
3.2.3 Standard Measurements
We may now drop the condition that the Hα are left invariant by the measurement and consider
the very general state transformations
ψ → ψα = TαPHαψ (3.7)
with operators Tα : Hα → H. Then, exactly as for the case of normal measurements, it follows
that Tα can be chosen to be unitary from Hα onto its range H˜α. The subspaces H˜α need be
neither orthogonal nor distinct. We shall write Rα = TαPHα for the general transition operators.
With Tα as chosen, Rα is characterized by the equation R
∗
αRα = PHα (where R
∗
α denotes the
adjoint of Rα).
The state transformations (3.7), given by unitaries Tα : Hα → H˜α, or equivalently by bounded
operators Rα on H satisfying R∗αRα = PHα, define what we shall call a standard measurement of
A. Note that normal measurements are standard measurements with H˜α = Hα (or H˜α ⊂ Hα).
Although standard measurements are in a sense more realistic than normal measurements (real
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world measurements are seldom reproducible in a strict sense), they are very rarely discussed in
textbooks. We emphasize that the crucial data in a standard measurement is given by Rα, which
governs both the state transformations (ψ → Raψ) and the probabilities (pα = 〈ψ, PHαψ〉 =
‖Rαψ‖2).
We shall illustrate the main features of standard measurements by considering a very simple
example: Let {e0, e1, e2, . . .}, be a fixed orthonormal basis of H and consider the standard mea-
surement whose results are the numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . and whose state transformations are defined
by the operators
Rα ≡ |e0〉〈eα| i.e., Rαψ = 〈eα, ψ〉e0, α = 0, 1, 2, . . .
With such Rα’s are associated the projections Pα = R
∗
αRα = |eα〉〈eα| , i.e., the projections
onto the one dimensional spaces Hα spanned respectively by the vectors eα. Thus, this is a
measurement of the operator A =
∑
α α|eα〉〈eα|. Note that the spaces H˜α, i.e. the ranges of the
Rα’s, are all the same and equal to the space H0 generated by the vector e0. The measurement
is then not normal since Hα 6= H˜α. Finally, note that this measurement could be regarded as
giving a simple model for a photo detection experiment, where any state is projected onto the
“vacuum state” e0 after the detection.
3.2.4 Strong Formal Measurements
We shall now relax the condition that α 7→ λα is one-to-one, as we would have to do for an
experiment having a general calibration α 7→ λα, which need not be invertible. This leads to
(what we shall call) a strong formal measurement. Since this notion provides the most general
formalization of the notion of a “measurement of a self-adjoint operator” that takes into account
the effect of the measurement on the state of the system, we shall spell it out precisely as follows:
Any complete (labelled) collection {Hα} of mutually orthogonal subspaces, any (la-
belled) set {λα} of not necessarily distinct real numbers, and any (labelled) collec-
tion {Rα} of bounded operators on H, such that R∗αRα ≡ PHα (the projection onto
Hα), defines a strong formal measurement.
(3.8)
A strong formal measurement will be compactly denoted by M ≡ {(Hα, λα, Rα)} ≡
{Hα, λα, Rα}, or even more compactly by M ≡ {λα, Rα} (the spaces Hα can be extracted
from the projections PHα = R
∗
αRα). With M is associated the operator A =
∑
λαPHα. Note
that since the λα are not necessarily distinct numbers, PHα need not be the spectral projection
PA(λα) associated with λα; in general
PA(λ) =
∑
α:λα=λ
PHα,
i.e., it is the sum of all the PHα’s that are associated with the value λ.
15 “To perform the
measurement M” on a system initially in ψ shall accordingly mean to perform a discrete ex-
periment E such that: 1) the probability p(λ) of getting the result λ is governed by A, i.e.,
15It is for this reason that it would be pointless and inappropriate to similarly generalize weak measurements.
It is only when the state transformation is taken into account that the distinction between the outcome α (which
determines the transformation) and the result λα (whose probability the formal measurement is to supply) becomes
relevant.
24
p(λ) = 〈ψ, PA(λ)ψ〉, and 2) the state transformations of E are those prescribed by M, i.e.,
ψ → ψα = Rαψ.
Observe that strong formal measurements do provide a more realistic formalization of the
notion of measurement of an operator than standard measurements: the notion of discrete ex-
periment does not imply a one-to-one correspondence between outcomes, i.e, final macroscopic
configurations of the pointer, and the numerical results of the experiment.
The relationship between (weak or strong) formal measurements, self-adjoint operators, and
experiments can be summarized by the following sequence of maps:
E 7→ M 7→ A (3.9)
The first map expresses thatM (weak or strong) is a formalization of E—it contains the “relevant
data” about E—and it will be many-to-one if M is a weak formal measurement16; the second
map expresses thatM is a formal measurement of A and it will be many-to-one ifM is (required
to be) strong and one-to-one if M is weak. Note that E 7→ A is always many-to-one.
3.3 From Formal Measurements to Experiments
Given a strong measurement M≡ {Hα, λα, Rα} one may easily construct a map (2.18) defining
a discrete experiment E = EM associated with M:
U : ψ ⊗ Φ0 7→
∑
α
(Rαψ)⊗ Φα (3.10)
The unitarity of U ( from H ⊗ Φ0 onto the range of U) follows then immediately from the
orthonormality of the {Φα} since∑
α
‖Rαψ‖2 =
∑
α
〈ψ,R∗αRαψ〉 = 〈ψ,
∑
α
PHαψ〉 = 〈ψ, ψ〉 = ‖ψ‖2 (3.11)
This experiment is abstractly characterized by: 1) the finite or countable set I of outcomes α,
2) the apparatus ready state Φ0 and the set {Φα} of normalized apparatus states, 3) the unitary
map U : H⊗ Φ0 →
⊕
αH⊗ Φα given by (3.10), 4) the calibration α 7→ λα assigning numerical
values (or a vector of such values) to the various outcomes α. Note that U need not arise from
a Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian governing the interaction between system and apparatus. Thus E
should properly be regarded as an “abstract” experiment as we have already pointed out in the
introduction to this section.
3.4 Von Neumann Measurements
We shall now briefly comment on the relation between our approach, based on formal measure-
ments, and the widely used formulation of quantum measurement in terms of von Neumann
measurements [74].
A von Neumann measurement of A =
∑
λαPHα on a system initially in the state ψ can be
described as follows (while the nondegeneracy of the eigenvalues of A—i.e., that dim(Hα) = 1—
is usually assumed, we shall not do so): Assume that the (relevant) configuration space of the
16There is an obvious natural unitary equivalence between the preimages E of a strong formal measurement
M.
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apparatus, whose generic configuration shall be denoted by y, is one-dimensional, so that its
Hilbert space HA ≃ L2(R), and that the interaction between system and apparatus is governed
by the Hamiltonian
H = HvN = γA⊗ Pˆy (3.12)
where Pˆy ≡ i~∂/∂y is (minus) the momentum operator of the apparatus. Let Φ0 = Φ0(y) be
the ready state of the apparatus. Then for ψ = PHαψ one easily sees that the unitary operator
U ≡ e−iTH/~ transforms the initial state ψα⊗Φ0 into ψα⊗Φα where Φα = Φ0(y−λαγT ), so that
the action of U on general ψ =
∑
PHαψ is
U : ψ ⊗ Φ0 →
∑
α
(PHαψ)⊗ Φα (3.13)
If Φ0 has sufficiently narrow support, say around y = 0, the Φα will have disjoint support
around the “pointer positions” yα = λαγT , and thus will be orthogonal, so that, with calibration
F (y) = y/γT (more precisely, F (y) = yα/γT for y in the support of Φα), the resulting von
Neumann measurement becomes a discrete experiment measuring A; comparing (3.13) and (3.5)
we see that it is an ideal measurement of A.17
Thus, the framework of von Neumann measurements is less general than that of discrete
experiments, or equivalently of strong formal measurements; at the same time, since the Hamil-
tonian HvN is not of Schro¨dinger type, von Neumann measurements are just as formal. (We note
that more general von Neumann measurements of A can be obtained by replacing HvN with more
general Hamiltonians; for example, H ′vN = H0 +HvN, where H0 is a self-adjoint operator on the
system Hilbert space which commutes with A, gives rise to a normal measurement of A, with
Rα = e
−iTH0/~PHα.Thus by proper extension of the von Neumann measurements one may arrive
at a framework of measurements completely equivalent to that of strong formal measurements.)
3.5 Preparation Procedures
Before discussing further extensions of the association between experiments and operators, we
shall comment on an implicit assumption apparently required for the measurement analysis to
be relevant: that the system upon which measurements are to be performed can be prepared in
any prescribed state ψ.
Firstly, we observe that the system can be prepared in a prescribed state ψ by means of
an appropriate standard measurement M performed on the system when it is initially in an
unknown state ψ′. We have to choose M ≡ {Hα, λα, Rα} in such a way that Rα0ψ′ = ψ, for
some α0 and all ψ
′, i.e., that Ran(Rα0) = span(ψ); then from reading the result λα0 we may
infer that the system has collapsed to the state ψ. The simplest possibility is for M to be an
ideal measurement with at least a one-dimensional subspace Hα0 that is spanned by ψ. Another
possibility is to perform a (nonideal) standard measurement like that of the example at the end
of Section 3.2.3, which can be regarded as defining a preparation procedure for the state e0.
Secondly, we wish to emphasize that the existence of preparation procedures is not as crucial
for relevance as it may seem. If we had only statistical knowledge about the initial state ψ,
nothing would change in our analysis of Bohmian experiments of Section 2, and in our conclusions
17It is usually required that von Neumann measurements be impulsive (γ large, T small) so that only the
interaction term (3.12) contributes significantly to the total Hamiltonian over the course of the measurement.
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concerning the emergence of self-adjoint operators, except that the uncertainty about the final
configuration of the pointer would originate from both quantum equilibrium and randomness in
ψ. We shall elaborate upon this later when we discuss Bohmian experiments for initial states
described by a density matrix.
3.6 Measurements of Commuting Families of Operators
As hinted in Section 2.7, the result of an experiment E might be more complex than we have sug-
gested until now in Section 3: it might be given by the vector λα ≡ (λ(1)α , . . . , λ(m)α ) corresponding
to the orientations of m pointers. For example, the apparatus itself may be a composite of m
devices with the possible results λ
(i)
α corresponding to the final state of the i-th device. Nothing
much will change in our discussion of measurements if we now replace the numbers λα with
the vectors λα ≡ (λ(1)α , . . . , λ(m)α ), since the dimension of the value space was not very relevant.
However E will now be associated, not with a single self-adjoint operator, but with a commuting
family of such operators. In other words, we arrive at the notion of an experiment E that is a
measurement of a commuting family of self-adjoint operators,18 namely the family
A ≡
∑
α
λαPHα =
(∑
α
λ(1)α PHα, . . . ,
∑
α
λ(m)α PHα
)
≡ (A1, . . . , Am). (3.14)
Then the notions of the various kinds of formal measurements—weak, ideal, normal, standard,
strong—extend straightforwardly to formal measurements of commuting families of operators. In
particular, for the general notion of weak formal measurement given by 3.4, P becomes a PVM on
Rm, with associated operators Ai =
∫
Rm
λ(i)P (dλ) [λ = (λ(1), . . . , λ(m)) ∈ Rm]. And just as for
PVMs on R and self-adjoint operators, this association in fact yields, by the spectral theorem,
a one-to-one correspondence between PVMs on Rm and commuting families of m self-adjoint
operators.The PVM corresponding to the commuting family (A1, . . . , Am) is in fact simply the
product PVM P = PA = PA1 × · · · × PAm given on product sets by
PA(∆1 × · · · ×∆m) = PA1(∆1) · · ·PAm(∆m), (3.15)
where PA1, . . . , PAm are the PVMs of A1, . . . , Am, and ∆i ⊂ R, with the associated probability
distributions on Rm given by the spectral measures for A
µAψ(∆) = 〈ψ, PA(∆)ψ〉 (3.16)
for any (Borel) set ∆ ⊂ Rm.
18We recall some basic facts about commuting families of self-adjoint operators [74, 71, 68]. The self-adjoint
operators A1, . . . , Am form a commuting family if they are bounded and pairwise commute, or, more generally,
if this is so for their spectral projections, i.e., if [PAi(∆), PAj (Γ)] = 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . ,m and (Borel) sets
∆,Γ ⊂ R. A commuting family A ≡ (A1, . . . , Am) of self-adjoint operators is called complete if every self-adjoint
operator C that commutes with all members of the family can be expressed as C = g(A1, A2, . . . ) for some function
g. The set of all such operators cannot be extended in any suitable sense (it is closed in all relevant operator
topologies). For any commuting family (A1, . . . , Am) of self-adjoint operators there is a self-adjoint operator B
and measurable functions fi such that Ai = fi(B). If the family is complete, then this operator has simple (i.e.,
nondegenerate) spectrum.
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In particular, for a PVM on Rm, corresponding to A = (A1, . . . , Am), the i-marginal distri-
bution, i.e., the distribution of the i-th component λ(i), is
µAψ(R× · · ·R×∆i × R× · · · × R) = 〈ψ, PAi(∆i)ψ〉 = µAiψ (∆i),
the spectral measure for Ai. Thus, by focusing on the respective pointer variables λ
(i), we
may regard an experiment measuring (or a weak formal measurement of) A = (A1, . . . , Am) as
providing an experiment measuring (or a weak formal measurement of) each Ai, just as would
be the case for a genuine measurement of m quantities A1, . . . , Am. Note also the following:
If {Hα, λα, Rα} is a strong formal measurement of A = (A1, . . . , Am), then {Hα, λ(i)α , Rα} is a
strong formal measurement of Ai, but if {Hα, λα, Rα} is an ideal, resp. normal, resp. standard,
measurement of A, {Hα, λ(i)α , Rα} need not be ideal, resp. normal, resp. standard.
There is a crucial point to observe: the same operator may belong to different commuting fam-
ilies. Consider, for example, a measurement of A = (A1, . . . , Am) and one of B = (B1, . . . , Bm),
where A1 = B1 ≡ C. Then while both measurements provide a measurement of C, they could be
totally different: the operators Ai and Bi for i 6= 1 need not commute and the PVMs of A and
B, as well as any corresponding experiments E A and E B, will be in general essentially different.
To emphasize this point we shall recall a famous example, the EPRB experiment [32, 14]: A
pair of spin one-half particles, prepared in a spin-singlet state
ψ =
1√
2
(
ψ(+) ⊗ ψ(−) + ψ(−) ⊗ ψ(+)) ,
are moving freely in opposite directions. Measurements are made, say by Stern-Gerlach magnets,
on selected components of the spins of the two particles. Let a, b, c be three different unit
vectors in space, let σ1 ≡ σ ⊗ I and let σ2 ≡ I ⊗ σ, where σ = (σx, σy, σz) are the Pauli
matrices. Then we could measure the operator σ1·a by measuring either of the commuting
families (σ1·a ,σ2·b) and (σ1·a ,σ2·c). However these measurements are different, both as weak
and as strong measurements, and of course as experiments. In Bohmian mechanics the result
obtained at one place at any given time will in fact depend upon the choice of the measurement
simultaneously performed at the other place (i.e., on whether the spin of the other particle is
measured along b or along c). However, the statistics of the results won’t be affected by the
choice of measurement at the other place because both choices yield measurements of the same
operator and thus their results must have the same statistical distribution.
3.7 Functions of Measurements
One of the most common experimental procedures is to recalibrate the scale of an experiment E :
if Z is the original result and f an appropriate function, recalibration by f leads to f(Z) as the
new result. Thus f(E ) has an obvious meaning. Moreover, if E 7→ A according to (2.37) then
µ
f(Z)
ψ = µ
Z
ψ ◦ f−1 = µAψ ◦ f−1, and
µAψ ◦ f−1(dλ) = 〈ψ, PA(f−1(dλ))ψ〉 = 〈ψ, P f(A)(dλ)ψ〉
where the last equality follows from the very definition of
f(A) =
∫
f(λ)PA(dλ) =
∫
λPA(f−1(dλ))
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provided by the spectral theorem. Thus,
if µZψ = µ
A
ψ then µ
f(Z)
ψ = µ
f(A)
ψ , (3.17)
i.e.,
if E 7→ A then f(E ) 7→ f(A). (3.18)
The notion of function of a formal measurement has then an unequivocal meaning: if M
is a weak formal measurement defined by the PVM P then f(M) is the weak formal mea-
surement defined by the PVM P ◦ f−1, so that if M is a measurement of A then f(M) is a
measurement of f(A); for a strong formal measurement M = {Hα, λα, Rα} the self-evident re-
quirement that the recalibration not affect the wave function transitions induced by M leads to
f(M) = {Hα, f(λα), Rα}. Note that ifM is a standard measurement, f(M) will in general not
be standard (since in general f can be many–to–one).
To highlight some subtleties of the notion of function of measurement we shall discuss two
examples: Suppose that M and M′ are respectively measurements of the commuting families
A = (A1, A2) and B = (B1, B2), with A1A2 = B1B2 = C. Let f : R
2 → R, f(λ1, λ2) = λ1λ2.
Then both f(M) and f(M′) are measurement of the same self-adjoint operator C. Nevertheless,
as strong measurements or as experiments, they could be very different: if A2 and B2 do not
commute they will be associated with different families of spectral projections. (Even more
simply, consider measurements Mx and My of σx and σy and let f(λ) = λ2. Then f(Mx) and
f(My) are measurement of I—so that the result must be 1)—but the two strong measurements,
as well as the corresponding experiments, are completely different.)
The second example is provided by measurements designed to determine whether the operator
A =
∑
λαPHα (the λα’s are distinct) has values in some given set ∆. This determination can
be accomplished in at least two different ways: Suppose that M is an ideal measurement of A
and let 1∆(λ) be the characteristic function of the set ∆. Then we could perform 1∆(M), that
is, we measure A and see whether “A ∈ ∆”. But we could also perform an “ideal determination
of A ∈ ∆”, that is, an ideal measurement of 1∆(A) = PA(∆). Now, both measurements provide
a “measurement of A ∈ ∆” (i.e., of the operator 1∆(A)), since in both cases the results 1 and 0
get assigned the same probabilities. However, as strong measurements, they are different: when
1∆(M) is performed, and the result 1 is obtained, ψ undergoes the transition
ψ → PHαψ
where α is the outcome with λα ∈ ∆ that actually occurs. On the other hand, for an ideal
measurement of 1∆(A), the occurrence of the result 1 will generate the transition
ψ → PA(∆)ψ =
∑
λα∈∆
PHαψ.
Note that in this case the state of the system is changed as little as possible. For example,
suppose that two eigenvalues, say λα1 , λα2, belong to ∆ and ψ = ψα1 + ψα2 ; then determination
by performing 1∆(M) will lead to either ψα1 or ψα2 , while the ideal determination of A ∈ ∆ will
not change the state.
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3.8 Measurements of Operators with Continuous Spectrum
We shall now reconsider the status of measurements of self-adjoint operators with continuous
spectrum. First of all, we remark that while on the weak level such measurements arise very
naturally—and, as already stressed in Section 3.1, are indeed the first to appear in Bohmian
mechanics—there is no straightforward extension of the notion of strong measurement to opera-
tors with continuous spectrum.
However, for given set of real numbers ∆, one may consider any determination of A ∈ ∆, that
is, any strong measurement of the spectral projection PA(∆). More generally, for any choice of
a simple function
f(λ) =
N∑
i=1
ci 1∆i(λ),
one may consider the strong measurements of f(A). In particular, let {f (n)} be a sequence of
simple functions converging to the identity, so that f (n)(A) → A, and let Mn be measurements
of f (n)(A). Then Mn are approximate measurements of A.
Observe that the foregoing applies to operators with discrete spectrum, as well as to operators
with continuous spectrum. But note that while on the weak level we always have
Mn →M ,
where M is a (general) weak measurement of A (in the sense of (3.4)), if A has continuous
spectrum M will not exist as a strong measurement (in any reasonable generalized sense, since
this would imply the existence of a bounded-operator-valued function Rλ on the spectrum of A
such that R∗λRλ dλ = P
A(dλ), which is clearly impossible). In other words, in this case there
can be no actual (generalized) strong measurement that the approximate measurements Mn
approximate—which is perfectly reasonable.
3.9 Sequential Measurements
Suppose that n measurements (with for each i, the λ
(i)
αi distinct)
M1 ≡ {H(1)α1 , λ(1)α1 , R(1)α1 }, . . . , Mn ≡ {H(n)αn , λ(n)αn , R(n)αn }
of operators (which need not commute)
A1 =
∑
α1
λ(1)α1P
(1)
α1
, . . . , An =
∑
αn
λ(n)αnP
(n)
αn
are successively performed on our system at times 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · < tN . Assume that the
duration of any single measurement is small with respect to the time differences ti− ti−1, so that
the measurements can be regarded as instantaneous. If in between two successive measurements
the system’s wave function changes unitarily with the operators Ut then, using obvious notation,
Probψ(A1 = λ
(1)
α1
, . . . , An = λ
(n)
αn ) = ‖R(n)αn (tn) · · · R(1)α1 (t1)ψ‖2, (3.19)
where R
(i)
αi (t) = U
−1
t R
(i)
αiUt and ψ is the initial (t = 0) wave function.
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To understand how (3.19) comes about consider first the case where n = 2 and t2 ≈ t1 ≈ 0.
According to standard probability rules, the probability of obtaining the results Z1 = λ
(1)
α1 for the
first measurement and Z2 = λ
(2)
α2 for the second one is the product
19
Probψ(Z2 = λ
(2)
α2
|Z1 = λ(1)α1 ) · Probψ(Z1 = λ(1)α1 )
where the first term is the probability of obtaining λ
(2)
α2 given that the result of the first measure-
ment is λ
(1)
α1 . Since M1 then transforms the wave function ψ to R(1)α1 ψ, the (normalized) initial
wave function for M2 is R(1)α1 ψ/‖R(1)α1 ψ‖, this probability is equal to
‖R(2)α2R(1)α1 ψ‖2
‖R(1)α1 ψ‖2
.
The second term, the probability of obtaining λ
(1)
α1 , is of course ‖R(1)α1 ψ‖2. Thus
Probψ(A
(1) = λ(1)α1 , A
(2) = λ(2)α2 ) = ‖R(2)α2R(1)α1 ψ‖2
in this case. Note that, in agreement with the analysis of discrete experiments (see Eq. (2.20)),
the probability of obtaining the results λ
(1)
α1 and λ
(2)
α2 turns out to be the square of the norm of the
final system wave function associated with these results. Now, for general times t1 and t2 − t1
between the preparation of ψ at t = 0 and the performance of M1 and between M1 and M2,
respectively, the final system wave function is R
(2)
α2Ut2−t1R
(1)
α1Ut1ψ = R
(2)
α2 Ut2U
−1
t1 R
(1)
α1 Ut1ψ. But
‖R(2)α2Ut2U−1t1 R(1)α1 Ut1ψ‖ = ‖U−1t2 R(2)α2Ut2U−1t1 R(1)α1Ut1ψ‖, and it is easy to see, just as for the simple
case just considered, that the square of the latter is the probability for the corresponding result,
whence (3.19) for n = 2. Iterating, i.e., by induction, we arrive at (3.19) for general n.
We note that when the measurementsM1, . . .Mn are ideal, the operators R(i)αi are the orthog-
onal projections P
(i)
αi , and equation (3.19) becomes the standard formula for the joint probabilities
of the results of a sequence of measurements of quantum observables, usually known as Wigner’s
formula [76].
It is important to observe that, even for ideal measurements, the joint probabilities
given by (3.19) are not in general a consistent family of joint distributions: summation
in (3.19) over the outcomes of the i-th measurement does not yield the joint probabil-
ities for the results of the measurements of the operators A1, . . . , Ai−1, Ai+1, . . . An per-
formed at the times t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . tn. (By rewriting the right hand side of (3.19) as
〈ψ,R(1)α1 (tn)∗ · · ·R(n)αn (tn)∗R(n)αn (tn)R(1)α1 (t1)ψ〉 one easily sees that the “sum rule” will be satisfied
when i = n or if the operators R
(i)
αi (ti) commute. More generally, the consistency is guaranteed
by the “decoherence conditions” of Griffiths, Omne`s, Gell-Mann and Hartle, and Goldstein and
Page [46, 35, 44].
19This is so because of the conditional independence of the outcomes of two successive measurements given
the final conditional wave function for the first measurement. More generally, the outcome of any measurement
depends only on the wave function resulting from the preceding one. For Bohmian experiments this independence
is a direct consequence of (2.10). One may wonder about the status of this independence for orthodox quantum
theory. We stress that while this issue might be problematical for orthodox quantum theory, it is not a problem
for Bohmian mechanics: the conditional independence of two successive measurements is a consequence of the
theory. (For more on this point, see [25]).) We also would like to stress that this independence assumption is in
fact crucial for orthodox quantum theory. Without it, it is hard to see how one could ever be justified in invoking
the quantum formalism. Any measurement we may consider will follow many earlier measurements.
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This failure of consistency means that the marginals of the joint probabilities given by (3.19)
are not themselves given by the corresponding case of the formula. This should, however, come as
no surprise: Since performing the measurement Mi affects the state of the system, the outcome
of Mi+1 should in general depend on whether or not Mi has been performed. Note that there
is nothing particularly quantum in the fact that measurements matter in this way: They matter
even for genuine measurements (unlike those we have been considering, in which nothing need
be genuinely measured), and even in classical physics, if the measurements are such that they
affect the state of the system.
The sequences of results λα ≡ (λ(1)α1 , . . . , λ(n)αn ), the associated state transformations Rα ≡
R
(n)
αnUtn−tn−1R
(n−1)
αn−1 · · · R(1)α1 Ut1 , and the probabilities (3.19) (i.e., given by pα = ‖Rα‖2) define what
we shall call a sequential measurement ofM1, · · ·Mn, which we shall denote byMn⊗ . . .⊗M1.
A sequential measurement does not in general define a formal measurement, neither weak nor
strong, since R∗αRα need not be a projection. This fact might seem disturbing (see, e.g., [21]);
we shall take up this issue in the next section.
3.10 Some Summarizing Remarks
The notion of formal measurement we have explored in this section is at the heart of the quantum
formalism. It embodies the two essential ingredients of a quantum measurement: the self-adjoint
operator A which represents the measured observable and the set of state transformations Rα
associated with the measured results. The operator always carries the information about the
statistics of possible results. The state transformations prescribe how the state of the system
changes when the measurement is performed. For ideal measurement the latter information is
also provided by the operator, but in general additional structure (the Rα’s) is required.
There are some important morals to draw. The association between measurements and oper-
ators is many-to-one: the same operator A can be measured by many different measurements,
for example ideal, or normal but not ideal. Among the possible measurements of A, we must
consider all possible measurements of commuting families of operators that include A, each of
which may correspond to entirely different experimental setups.
A related fact: not all measurements are ideal measurements.20 No argument, physical or
mathematical, suggests that ideal measurements should be regarded as “more correct” than any
20In this regard we observe that the vague belief in a universal collapse rule is as old, almost, as quantum
mechanics. It is reflected in von Neumann’s formulation of quantum mechanics [74], based on two distinct dy-
namical laws: a unitary evolution between measurements , and a nonunitary evolution when measurements are
performed. However, von Neumann’s original proposal [74] for the nonunitary evolution—that when a measure-
ment of A =
∑
α λαPHα is performed upon a system in the state given by the density matrix W , the state of the
system after the measurement is represented by the density matrix
W ′ =
∑
α
∑
β
〈φαβ ,Wφαβ〉P[φαβ ]
where, for each α, {φαβ} is a basis for Hα—does not treat the general measurement as ideal. Moreover, this
expression in general depends on the choice of the basis {φαβ}, and was thus criticized by Lu¨ders [61], who
proposed the transformation
W →W ′ =
∑
α
PHαWPHα ,
as it gives a unique prescription. Note that for W = P[ψ], where P[ψ] is the projection onto the initial pure state
ψ, W ′ =
∑
α pαP[ψα], where pα = |〈ψ, PHαψ〉|2 and ψα = PHαψ, corresponding to an ideal measurement.
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other type. In particular, the Wigner formula for the statistics of a sequence of ideal measure-
ments is no more correct than the formula (3.19) for a sequence of more general measurement.
Granting a privileged status to ideal measurements amounts to a drastic and arbitrary restric-
tion on the quantum formalism qua measurement formalism, since many (in fact most) real world
measurements would be left out.
In this regard we note that the arbitrary restriction to ideal measurements affects the research
program of “decoherent” or “consistent” histories [35, 65, 46], since Wigner’s formula for a se-
quence of ideal measurements is unquestionably at its basis. (It should be emphasized however
that the special status granted to ideal measurements is probably not the main difficulty with
this approach. The no-hidden-variables theorems, which we shall discuss in Section 7, show that
the totality of different families of weakly decohering histories, with their respective probability
formulas, is genuinely inconsistent. While such inconsistency is perfectly acceptable for a mea-
surement formalism, it is hard to see how it can be tolerated as the basis of what is claimed to
be a fundamental theory. For more on this, see [25, 43].
4 The Extended Quantum Formalism
As indicated in Section 2.9, the textbook quantum formalism is merely an idealization. As
just stressed, not all real world measurements are ideal. In fact, in the real world the projection
postulate—that when the measurement of an observable yields a specific value, the wave function
of the system is replaced by its projection onto the corresponding eigenspace—is rarely obeyed.
More importantly, a great many significant real-world experiments are simply not at all associated
with operators in the usual way. Consider for example an electron with fairly general initial wave
function, and surround the electron with a “photographic” plate, away from (the support of the
wave function of) the electron, but not too far away. This setup measures the position of “escape”
of the electron from the region surrounded by the plate. Notice that since in general the time of
escape is random, it is not at all clear which operator should correspond to the escape position—
it should not be the Heisenberg position operator at a specific time, and a Heisenberg position
operator at a random time has no meaning. In fact, there is presumably no such operator, so that
for the experiment just described the probabilities for the possible results cannot be expressed
in the form (2.37), and in fact are not given by the spectral measure for any operator.
Time measurements, for example escape times or decay times, are particularly embarrassing
for the quantum formalism. This subject remains mired in controversy, with various research
groups proposing their own favorite candidates for the “time operator” while paying little at-
tention to the proposals of the other groups. For an analysis of time measurements within the
framework of Bohmian mechanics, see [20]; in this regard see also [57, 58, 59, 47].
Because of these and other difficulties, it has been proposed that we should go beyond
operators-as-observables, to “generalized observables,” described by mathematical objects even
more abstract than operators (see, e.g., the books of Davies [21], Holevo [50] and Kraus [55]). The
basis of this generalization lies in the observation that, by the spectral theorem, the concept of
self-adjoint operator is completely equivalent to that of (a normalized) projection-valued measure
(PVM), an orthogonal-projection-valued additive set function, on the value space R. Orthogonal
projections are among the simplest examples of positive operators, and a natural generalization
of a “quantum observable” is provided by a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM): a nor-
malized, countably additive set function O whose values are positive operators on a Hilbert space
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H. When a POVM is sandwiched by a wave function it generates a probability distribution
µOψ : ∆ 7→ µOψ (∆) ≡ 〈ψ,O(∆)ψ〉 (4.1)
in exactly the same manner as a PVM.
4.1 POVMs and Bohmian Experiments
From a fundamental perspective, it may seem that we would regard this generalization, to
positive-operator-valued measures, as a step in the wrong direction, since it supplies us with
a new, much larger class of fundamentally unneeded abstract mathematical entities far removed
from the basic ingredients of Bohmian mechanics. However from the perspective of Bohmian
phenomenology positive-operator-valued measures form an extremely natural class of objects—
indeed more natural than projection-valued measures.
To see how this comes about observe that (2.18) defines a family of bounded linear operators
Rα by
P[Φα] [U(ψ ⊗ Φ0)] = (Rαψ)⊗ Φα, (4.2)
in terms of which we may rewrite the probability (2.20) of obtaining the result λα (distinct) in a
generic discrete experiment as
pα = ‖ψα‖2 = ‖Rαψ‖2 = 〈ψ,R∗αRαψ〉 . (4.3)
By the unitarity of the overall evolution of system and apparatus we have that
∑
α ‖ψα‖2 =∑
α〈ψ,R∗αRαψ〉 = 1 for all ψ ∈ H, whence∑
α
R∗αRα = I . (4.4)
The operators Oα ≡ R∗αRα are obviously positive, i.e.,
〈ψ,Oαψ〉 ≥ 0 for all ψ ∈ H (4.5)
and by (4.4) sum up to the identity, ∑
α
Oα = I . (4.6)
Thus we may associate with a generic discrete experiment E—with no assumptions about repro-
ducibility or anything else, but merely unitarity—a POVM
O(∆) =
∑
λα∈∆
Oα ≡
∑
λα∈∆
R∗αRα, (4.7)
in terms of which the statistics of the results can be expressed in a compact way: the probability
that the result of the experiment lies in a set ∆ is given by∑
λα∈∆
pα =
∑
λα∈∆
〈ψ,Oαψ〉 = 〈ψ,O(∆)ψ〉 . (4.8)
Moreover, it follows from (2.18) and (4.2) that E generates state transformations
ψ → ψα = Rαψ . (4.9)
34
4.2 Formal Experiments
The association between experiments and POVMs can be extended to a general experiment (2.34)
in a straightforward way. In analogy with (2.37) we shall say that the POVM O is associated
with the experiment E whenever the probability distribution (2.35) of the results of E is equal
to the probability measure (4.1) generated by O, i.e.,21
E 7→ O if and only if ρZψ = µOψ , (4.10)
We may now proceed as in Section 3 and analyze on a formal level the association (4.10) by
introducing the notions of weak and strong formal experiment as the obvious generalizations of
(3.4) and (3.8):
Any positive-operator-valued measure O defines the weak formal experiment E ≡ O.
Any set {λα} of not necessarily distinct real numbers (or vectors of real numbers)
paired with any collection {Rα} of bounded operators on H such that
∑
R∗αRα = I
defines the strong formal experiment E ≡ {λα, Rα} with associated POVM (4.7)
and state transformations (4.9).
(4.11)
The notion of formal experiment is a genuine extension of that of formal measurement, the
latter being the special case in which O is a PVM and R∗αRα are the projections.
Formal experiments share with formal measurements many features. This is so because all
measure-theoretic properties of projection-valued measures extend to positive-operator-valued
measures. For example, just as for PVMs, integration of real functions against positive-operator-
valued measure is a meaningful operation that generates self-adjoint operators: for given real
(and measurable) function f , the operator B =
∫
f(λ)O(dλ) is a self-adjoint operator defined,
say, by its matrix elements 〈φ,Bψ〉 = ∫ λµφ,ψ(dλ) for all φ and ψ in H, where µφ,ψ is the complex
measure µφ,ψ(dλ) = 〈φ,O(dλ)ψ〉. (We ignore the difficulties that might arise if f is not bounded.)
In particular, with O is associated the self-adjoint operator
AO ≡
∫
λO(dλ). (4.12)
It is however important to observe that this association (unlike the case of PVMs, for which
the spectral theorem provides the inverse) is not invertible, since the self-adjoint operator AO is
always associated with the PVM provided by the spectral theorem. Thus, unlike PVMs, POVMs
are not equivalent to self-adjoint operators. In general, the operator AO will carry information
only about the mean value of the statistics of the results,∫
λ 〈ψ,O(dλ)ψ〉 = 〈ψ,AOψ〉 ,
while for the higher moments we should expect that∫
λn 〈ψ,O(dλ)ψ〉 6= 〈ψ,AnOψ〉
21Whenever (4.10) is satisfied we may say that the experiment E is a measurement of the generalized observable
O. We shall however avoid this terminology in connection with generalized observables; even when it is standard
(so that we use it), i.e., when O is a PVM and thus equivalent to a self-adjoint operator, it is in fact improper.
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unless O is a PVM.
What we have just described is an important difference between general formal experiments
and formal measurements. This and other differences originate from the fact that a POVM is a
much weaker notion than a PVM. For example, a POVM O on Rm—like ordinary measures and
unlike PVMs—need not be a product measure: If O1, . . . , Om are the marginals of O,
O1(∆1) = O(∆1 ×Rm−1) , . . . , Om(∆m) = O(Rm−1 ×∆m),
the product POVM O1 × · · · × Om will be in general different from O. (This is trivial since any
probability measure on Rm times the identity is a POVM.)
Another important difference between the notion of POVM and that of PVM is this: while the
projections P (∆) of a PVM, for different ∆’s, commute, the operators O(∆) of a generic POVM
need not commute. An illustration of how this may naturally arise is provided by sequential
measurements.
A sequential measurement (see Section 3.9)Mn ⊗ . . .⊗M1 is indeed a very simple example
of a formal experiment that in general is not a formal measurement (see also Davies [21]). We
have that
Mn ⊗ . . .⊗M1 = {λα, Rα}
where
λα ≡ (λ(1)α1 , . . . , λ(n)αn )
and
Rα ≡ R(n)αnUtn−tn−1R(n−1)αn−1 · · · R(1)α1 .Ut1 .
Note that since pα = ‖Rαψ‖2, we have that∑
α
R∗αRα = I
, which also follows directly using∑
αj
R(j)αj
∗R(j)αj = I , j = 1, . . . , n
Now, with Mn ⊗ . . .⊗M1 is associated the POVM
O(∆) =
∑
λα∈∆
R∗αRα .
Note that O(∆) and O(∆′) in general don’t commute since in general Rα and Rβ may fail to do
so.
An interesting class of POVMs for which O(∆) and O(∆′) do commute arises in association
with the notion of an “approximate measurement” of a self-adjoint operator: suppose that the
result Z of a measurement M = PA of a self-adjoint operator A is distorted by the addition of
an independent noise N with symmetric probability distribution η(λ). Then the result Z +N of
the experiment, for initial system wave function ψ, is distributed according to
∆ 7→
∫
∆
∫
R
η(λ− λ′)〈ψ, PA(dλ′)ψ〉 dλ ,
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which can be rewritten as
∆ 7→ 〈ψ,
∫
∆
η(λ−A)dλ ψ〉 .
Thus the result Z +N is governed by the POVM
O(∆) =
∫
∆
η(λ− A) dλ . (4.13)
The formal experiment defined by this POVM can be regarded as providing an approximate
measurement of A. For example, let
η(λ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
λ2
2σ2 . (4.14)
Then for σ → 0 the POVM (4.13) becomes the PVM of A and the experiment becomes a
measurement of A.
Concerning the POVM (4.13) we wish to make two remarks. The first is that the O(∆)’s
commute since they are all functions of A. The second is that this POVM has a continuous
density, i.e.,
O(dλ) = o(λ) dλ where o(λ) = η(λ− A) .
This is another difference between POVMs and PVMs: like ordinary measures and unlike PVMs,
POVMs may have a continuous density. The reason this is possible for POVMs is that, for a
POVM O, unlike for a PVM, given ψ ∈ H , the vectors O(∆)ψ and O(∆′)ψ, for ∆ and ∆′ disjoint
and arbitrarily small, need not be orthogonal. Otherwise, no density o(dλ) could exist, because
this would imply that there is a continuous family {o(λ)ψ} of orthogonal vectors in H.
Finally, we observe that unlike strong measurements, the notion of strong formal experiment
can be extended to POVM with continuous spectrum (see Section 3.8). One may in fact define
a strong experiment by E = {λ,Rλ}, where λ 7→ Rλ is a continuous bounded-operator-valued
function such that
∫
R∗λRλ d λ = I. Then the statistics for the results of such an experiment is
governed by the POVM O(dλ) ≡ R∗λRλ dλ. For example, let
Rλ = ξ (λ−A) where ξ (λ) = 1√
σ 4
√
2pi
e−
λ2
4σ2 .
Then O(dλ) = R∗λRλ d λ is the POVM (4.13) with η given by (4.14). We observe that the state
transformations (cf. the definition (2.6) of the conditional wave function)
ψ → Rλψ = 1√
σ 4
√
2pi
e−
(λ−A)2
4σ2 ψ (4.15)
can be regarded as arising from a von Neumann interaction with Hamiltonian (3.12) (and γT = 1)
and ready state of the apparatus
Φ0(y) =
1√
σ 4
√
2pi
e−
y2
4σ2 .
Experiments with state transformations (4.15), for large σ, have been considered by Aharonov and
coworkers (see, e.g., Aharonov, Anandan, and Vaidman [1]) as providing “weak measurements” of
operators. (The effect of the measurement on the state of the system is “small” if σ is sufficiently
large). This terminology notwithstanding, it is important to observe that such experiments are
not measurements of A in the sense we have discussed here. They give information about the
average value of A, since
∫
λ 〈ψ,R∗λRλ ψ〉 dλ = 〈ψ,Aψ〉, but presumably none about its higher
moments.
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4.3 From Formal Experiments to Experiments
Just as with a formal measurement (see Section 3.3), with a formal experiment E ≡ {λα, Rα},
we may associate a discrete experiment E . The unitary map (2.18) of E will be given again by
(3.10), i.e.,
U : ψ ⊗ Φ0 7→
∑
α
(Rαψ)⊗ Φα, (4.16)
but now R∗αRα of course need not be projection. The unitarity of U follows immediately from
the orthonormality of the Φα using
∑
R∗αRα = I. (Note that with a weak formal experiment
E ≡ O = {Oα} we may associate many inequivalent discrete experiments, defined by (4.16) with
operators Rα ≡ Uα
√
Oα, for any choice of unitary operators Uα.)
We shall now discuss a concrete example of a discrete experiment defined by a formal exper-
iment which will allow us to make some more further comments on the issue of reproducibility
discussed in Section 2.8.
Let {. . . , e−1, e0, e1, . . . } be an orthonormal basis in the system Hilbert spaceH, let P− , P0 , P+
be the orthogonal projections onto the subspaces H˜−, H0, H˜+ spanned by {e}α<0, {e0}, {e}α>0
respectively, and let V+, V− be the right and left shift operators,
V+eα = eα+1 , V−eα = eα−1 .
Consider the strong formal experiment E with the two possible results λ± = ±1 and associated
state transformations
R±1 = V±(P± +
1√
2
P0). (4.17)
Then the unitary U of the corresponding discrete experiment E is given by
U : ψ ⊗ Φ0 → R−ψ ⊗ Φ− +R+ψ ⊗ Φ+,
where Φ0 is the ready state of the apparatus and Φ± are the apparatus states associated with
the results ±1. If we now consider the action of U on the basis vectors eα,
U(eα ⊗ Φ0) = eα+1 ⊗ Φ+ for α > 0
U(eα ⊗ Φ0) = eα−1 ⊗ Φ− for α < 0
U(e0 ⊗ Φ0) = 1√
2
(e1 ⊗ Φ+ + e−1 ⊗ Φ−) ,
we see immediately that
U(H˜± ⊗ Φ0) ⊂ H˜± ⊗ Φ±1.
Thus (2.24) is satisfied and E is a reproducible experiment. Note however that the POVM
O = {O−1, O+1} associated with (4.17),
O±1 = R
∗
±1R±1 = P± +
1
2
P0 ,
is not a PVM since the positive operators O±1 are not projections, i.e, O
2
±1 6= O±1. Thus E
is not a measurement of any self-adjoint operator, which shows that without the assumption of
the finite dimensionality of the subspaces H˜α a reproducible discrete experiment need not be a
measurement of a self-adjoint operator.
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4.4 Measure-Valued Quadratic Maps
We conclude this section with a remark about POVMs. Via (4.1) every POVM O defines a
“normalized quadratic map” fromH to measures on some space (the value-space for the POVM).
Moreover, every such map comes from a POVM in this way. Thus the two notions are equivalent:
(4.1) defines a canonical one-to-one correspondence between POVMs and normal-
ized measure-valued quadratic maps on H. (4.18)
To say that a measure-valued map on H
ψ 7→ µψ (4.19)
is quadratic means that
µψ = B(ψ, ψ) (4.20)
is the diagonal part of a sesquilinear map B, from H × H to the complex measures on some
value space Λ. If B(ψ, ψ) is a probability measure whenever ‖ψ‖ = 1, we say that the map is
normalized.22
Proposition (4.18) is a consequences of the following considerations: For a given POVM O the
map ψ 7→ µOψ , where µOψ (∆) ≡ 〈ψ,O(∆)ψ〉, is manifestly quadratic, with B(φ, ψ) = 〈φ,O(·)ψ〉,
and it is obviously normalized. Conversely, let ψ 7→ µψ be a normalized measure-valued quadratic
map, corresponding to some B, and write B∆(φ, ψ) = B(φ, ψ)[∆] for the complex measure B at
the Borel set ∆. By the Schwartz inequality, applied to the positive form B∆(φ, ψ), we have that
|B∆(φ, ψ)| ≤ ‖ψ‖‖φ‖. Thus, using Riesz’s lemma [70], there is a unique bounded operator O(∆)
on H such that
B∆(φ, ψ) = 〈φ,O(∆)ψ〉.
Moreover, O(∆), like B∆, is countably additive in ∆, and since B(ψ, ψ) is a (positive) measure,
O is a positive-operator-valued measure, normalized because B is.
A simple example of a normalized measure-valued quadratic map is
Ψ 7→ ρΨ(dq) = |Ψ|2dq , (4.21)
whose associated POVM is the PVM P Qˆ for the position (configuration) operator
QˆΨ(q) = qΨ(q) . (4.22)
Note also that if the quadratic map µψ corresponds to the POVM O, then, for any unitary
U , the composite map ψ 7→ µ
Uψ
corresponds to the POVM U∗OU , since 〈Uψ,O(∆)Uψ〉 =
〈ψ, U∗O(∆)Uψ〉. In particular for the map (4.21) and U = UT , the composite map corresponds
to the PVM P QˆT , with QˆT = U
∗QˆU , the Heisenberg position (configuration) at time T , since
U∗TP
QˆUT = P
U∗T QˆUT .
22A sesquilinear map B(φ, ψ) is one that is linear in the second slot and conjugate linear in the first:
B(φ, αψ1 + βψ2) = αB(φ, ψ1) + βB(φ, ψ2)
B(αφ1 + βφ2, ψ) = α¯B(φ1, ψ) + β¯B(φ2, ψ) .
Clearly any such normalized B can be chosen to be conjugate symmetric, B(ψ, φ) = B(φ, ψ), without affecting
its diagonal, and it follows from polarization that any such B must in fact be conjugate symmetric.
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5 The General Emergence of Operators
For Bohmian mechanics POVMs emerge naturally, not for discrete experiments, but for a general
experiment (2.34). To see how this comes about consider the probability measure (2.35) giving
the probability distribution of the result Z = F (QT ) of the experiment, where QT is the final
configuration of system and apparatus and F is the calibration function expressing the numerical
result, for example the orientation Θ of a pointer. Then the map
ψ 7→ ρZψ = ρΨT ◦ F−1, (5.1)
from the initial wave function of the system to the probability distribution of the result, is
quadratic since it arises from the sequence of maps
ψ 7→ Ψ = ψ ⊗ Φ0 7→ ΨT = U(ψ ⊗ Φ0) 7→ ρΨT (dq) = Ψ∗TΨTdq 7→ ρZψ = ρΨT ◦ F−1, (5.2)
where the middle map, to the quantum equilibrium distribution, is obviously quadratic, while
all the other maps are linear, all but the second trivially so. Now, by (4.18), the notion of
such a quadratic map (5.1) is completely equivalent to that of a POVM on the system Hilbert
space H. (The sesquilinear map B associated with (5.2) is B(ψ1, ψ2) = Ψ∗1TΨ2Tdq ◦ F−1, where
Ψi T = U(ψi ⊗ Φ0).)
Thus the emergence and role of POVMs as generalized observables in Bohmian mechanics is
merely an expression of the sesquilinearity of quantum equilibrium together with the linearity
of the Schro¨dinger evolution. Thus the fact that with every experiment is associated a POVM,
which forms a compact expression of the statistics for the possible results, is a near mathematical
triviality. It is therefore rather dubious that the occurrence of POVMs—the simplest case of which
is that of PVMs—as observables can be regarded as suggesting any deep truths about reality or
about epistemology.
An explicit formula for the POVM defined by the quadratic map (5.1) follows immediately
from (5.2):
ρZψ(dλ) = 〈ψ ⊗ Φ0, U∗P Qˆ(F−1(dλ))U ψ ⊗ Φ0〉 = 〈ψ ⊗ Φ0, P0U∗P Qˆ(F−1(dλ))UP0 ψ ⊗ Φ0〉
where P Qˆ is the PVM for the position (configuration) operator (4.22) and P0 is the projection
onto H⊗ Φ0, whence
O(dλ) = 1−1Φ0P0 U
∗P Qˆ(F−1(dλ))UP01Φ0 , (5.3)
where 1Φ0ψ = ψ⊗Φ0 is the natural identification of H with H⊗Φ0. This is the obvious POVM
reflecting the essential structure of the experiment.23
23This POVM can also be written as
O(dλ) = trA
[
P0 U
∗P Qˆ(F−1(dλ))U
]
, (5.4)
where trA is the partial trace over the apparatus variables. The partial trace is a map trA : W 7→ trA(W ),
from trace class operators on the Hilbert space HS ⊗ HA to trace class operators on HS , uniquely defined by
tr S(trA(W )B) = tr S+A(WB ⊗ I), where tr S+A and tr S are the usual (scalar-valued) traces of operators on
HS ⊗ HA and HS , respectively. For a trace class operator B on L2(dx) ⊗ L2(dy) with kernel B(x, y, x′, y′) we
have trA (B) (x, x
′) =
∫
B(x, y, x′, y)dy. In (5.4) trA is applied to operators that need not be trace class—nor
need the operator on the left be trace class—since, e.g., O(Λ) = I. The formula nonetheless makes sense.
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Note that the POVM (5.3) is unitarily equivalent to
P0P
F (QˆT )(dλ)P0 (5.5)
where QˆT is the Heisenberg configuration of system and apparatus at time T . This POVM, acting
on the subspace H ⊗ Φ0, is the projection to that subspace of a PVM, the spectral projections
for F (QˆT ). Naimark has shown (see, e.g., [21]) that every POVM is equivalent to one that arises
in this way, as the orthogonal projection of a PVM to a subspace.24
We shall now illustrate the association of POVMs with experiments by considering some
special cases of (5.2).
5.1 “No Interaction” Experiments
Let U = US ⊗ UA in (5.2) (hereafter the indices “S” and “A” shall refer, respectively, to system
and apparatus). Then for F (x, y) = y the measure-valued quadratic map defined by (5.2) is
ψ 7→ c(y)‖ψ‖2dy
where c(y) = |UAΦ0|2(y), with POVM O1(dy) = c(y)dy IS, while for F (q) = q = (x, y) the map
is
ψ 7→ c(y) |USψ|2(x) dq
with corresponding POVM O2(dq) = c(y)U
∗
SP
Xˆ(dx)US dy. Neither O1 nor O2 is a PVM. How-
ever, if F is independent of y, F (x, y) = F (x), then the apparatus can be ignored in (5.2) or
(5.3) and O = U∗SP
XˆUS ◦ F−1, i.e.,
O(dλ) = U∗SP
Xˆ(F−1(dλ))US ,
which is manifestly a PVM—in fact corresponding to F (XˆT ), where XˆT is the Heisenberg con-
figuration of the system at the end of the experiment.
This case is somewhat degenerate: with no interaction between system and apparatus it
hardly seems anything like a measurement. However, it does illustrate that it is “true” POVMs
(i.e., those that aren’t PVMs) that typically get associated with experiments—i.e., unless some
special conditions hold (here that F = F (x)).
5.2 “No X” Experiments
The map (5.2) is well defined even when the system (the x-system) has no translational degrees of
freedom, so that there is no x (or X). This will be the case, for example, when the system Hilbert
space HS corresponds to the spin degrees of freedom. Then HS = Cn is finite dimensional.
24If O(dλ) is a POVM on Σ acting on H, then the Hilbert space on which the corresponding PVM acts is
the natural Hilbert space associated with the data at hand, namely L2(Σ,H, O(dλ)), the space of H-valued
functions ψ(λ) on Σ, with inner product given by
∫ 〈ψ(λ), O(dλ)φ(λ)〉. (If this is not, in fact, positive definite,
then the quotient with its kernel should be taken—ψ(λ) should, in other words, be understood as the appropriate
equivalence class.) Then O(dλ) is equivalent to PE(dλ)P , where E(∆) = 1ˆ∆(λ), multiplication by 1∆(λ), and P
is the orthogonal projection onto the subspace of constant H-valued functions ψ(λ) = ψ.
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In such cases, the calibration F of course is a function of y alone, since there is no x. For
F = y the measure-valued quadratic map defined by (5.2) is
ψ 7→ |[U(ψ ⊗ Φ0)](y)|2dy , (5.6)
where | · · · | denotes the norm in Cn.
This case is physically more interesting than the previous one, though it might appear rather
puzzling since until now our measured systems have always involved configurations. After all,
without configurations there is no Bohmian mechanics! However, what is relevant from a Bohmian
perspective is that the composite of system and apparatus be governed by Bohmian mechanics,
and this may well be the case if the apparatus has configurational degrees of freedom, even if
what is called the system doesn’t. Moreover, this case provides the prototype of many real-world
experiments, e.g., spin measurements.
For the measurement of a spin component of a spin–1/2 particle—recall the description of the
Stern-Gerlach experiment given in Section 2.5—we letHS = C2, the spin space, with “apparatus”
configuration y = x, the position of the particle, and with suitable calibration F (x). (For a real
world experiment there would also have to be a genuine apparatus—a detector—that measures
where the particle actually is at the end of the experiment, but this would not in any way affect
our analysis. We shall elaborate upon this below.) The unitary U of the experiment is the
evolution operator up to time T generated by the Pauli Hamiltonian (2.12), which under the
assumption (2.14) becomes
H = − ~
2
2m
∇
2 − (b+ az)σz (5.7)
Moreover, as in Section 2.5, we shall assume that the initial particle wave function has the
form Φ0(x) = Φ0(z)φ(x, y).
25 Then for F (x) = z the quadratic map (5.2) is
ψ 7→
(
|〈ψ+, ψ〉|2|Φ(+)T (z)|2 + |〈ψ−, ψ〉|2|Φ(−)T (z)|2
)
dz
=
〈
ψ , |ψ+〉〈ψ+||Φ(+)T (z)|2 + |ψ−〉〈ψ−||Φ(−)T (z)|2 ψ
〉
dz
with POVM
O(dz) =
(
|Φ(+)T (z)|2 0
0 |Φ(−)T (z)|2
)
dz , (5.8)
where ψ± are the eigenvectors (2.13) of σz and Φ
(±)
T are the solutions of (2.15) computed at t = T ,
for initial conditions Φ0
(±) = Φ0(z).
Consider now the appropriate calibration for the Stern-Gerlach experiment, namely the func-
tion
F (x) =
{
+1 if z > 0,
−1 if z < 0 (5.9)
which assigns to the outcomes of the experiment the desired numerical results: if the particle
goes up in the z- direction the spin is +1, while if the particle goes down the spin is -1. The
corresponding POVM OT is defined by
OT (+1) =
(
p+T 0
0 p−T
)
OT (−1) =
(
1− p+T 0
0 1− p−T
)
25We abuse notation here in using the notation y = x = (x, y, z). The y on the right should of course not be
confused with the one on the left.
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where
p+T =
∫ ∞
0
|ΦT (+)|2(z)dz, p−T =
∫ ∞
0
|ΦT (−)|2(z)dz .
It should be noted that OT is not a PVM. However, as indicated in Section 2.5, as T → ∞,
p+T → 1 and p−T → 0, and the POVM OT becomes the PVM of the operator σz, i.e., OT → P σz ,
defined by
P (+1) =
(
1 0
0 0
)
P (−1) =
(
0 0
0 1
)
(5.10)
and the experiment becomes a measurement of the operator σz .
5.3 “No Y ” Experiments
Suppose now that the “apparatus”involves no translational degrees of freedom, i.e., that there is
no y (or Y ). For example, suppose the apparatus Hilbert space HA corresponds to certain spin
degrees of freedom, with HA = Cn finite dimensional. Then, of course, F = F (x).
This case illustrates what measurements are not. If the apparatus has no configurational
degrees of freedom, then neither in Bohmian mechanics nor in orthodox quantum mechanics is
it a bona fide apparatus: Whatever virtues such an apparatus might otherwise have, it certainly
can’t generate any directly observable results (at least not when the system itself is microscopic).
According to Bohr ([17], pages 73 and 90): “Every atomic phenomenon is closed in the sense
that its observation is based on registrations obtained by means of suitable amplification devices
with irreversible functioning such as, for example, permanent marks on the photographic plate”
and “the quantum-mechanical formalism permits well-defined applications only to such closed
phenomena.” To stress this point, discussing particle detection Bell has said [7]: “Let us suppose
that a discharged counter pops up a flag sayings ‘Yes’ just to emphasize that it is a macroscopically
different thing from an undischarged counter, in a very different region of configuration space.”
Experiments based on certain micro-apparatuses, e.g., “one-bit detectors” [73], provide a nice
example of “No Y” experiments. We may think of a one-bit detector as a spin-1/2-like system
(e.g., a two-level atom), with “down” state Φ0 (the ready state) and “up” state Φ1 and which is
such that its configurational degrees of freedom can be ignored. Suppose that this “spin-system,”
in its “down” state, is placed in a small spatial region ∆1 and consider a particle whose wave
function has been prepared in such a way that at t = 0 it has the form ψ = ψ1 + ψ2, where ψ1 is
supported by ∆1 and ψ2 by ∆2 disjoint from ∆1. Assume that the particle interacts locally with
the spin-system, in the sense that were ψ = ψ1 the “spin” would flip to the “up” state, while were
ψ = ψ2 it would remain in its “down” state, and that the interaction time is negligibly small,
so that other contributions to the Hamiltonian can be ignored. Then the initial state ψ ⊗ Φ0
undergoes the unitary transformation
U : ψ ⊗ Φ0→Ψ = ψ1 ⊗ Φ1 + ψ2 ⊗ Φ0 . (5.11)
We may now ask whether U defines an experiment genuinely measuring whether the particle is
in ∆1 or ∆2. The answer of course is no (since in this experiment there is no apparatus property at
all with which the position of the particle could be correlated) unless the experiment is (quickly)
completed by a measurement of the “spin” by means of another (macroscopic) apparatus. In
other words, we may conclude that the particle is in ∆1 only if the spin-system in effect pops up
a flag saying “up”.
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5.4 “No Y no Φ” Experiments
Suppose there is no apparatus at all: no apparatus configuration y nor Hilbert space HA, or,
what amounts to the same thing, HA = C. For calibration F = x the measure-valued quadratic
map defined by (5.2) is
ψ 7→ |Uψ(x)|2 ,
with POVM U∗P XˆU , while the POVM for general calibration F (x) is
O(dλ) = U∗P Xˆ(F−1(dλ))U . (5.12)
O is a PVM, as mentioned in Section 5.1, corresponding to the operator U∗F (Xˆ)U = F (XˆT ),
where XˆT is the Heisenberg position (configuration) operator at time T .
It is important to observe that even though these experiments suffer from the defect that no
correlation is established between the system and an apparatus, this can easily be remedied—by
adding a final detection measurement that measures the final actual configuration XT—without
in any way affecting the essential formal structure of the experiment. For these experiments
the apparatus thus does not introduce any additional randomness, but merely reflects what was
already present in XT . All randomness in the final result
Z = F (XT ) (5.13)
arises from randomness in the initial configuration of the system.26
For F = x and U = I the quadratic map is ψ 7→ |ψ(x)|2 with PVM P Xˆ , so that this (trivial)
experiment corresponds to the simplest and most basic operator of quantum mechanics: the
position operator. How other basic operators arise from experiments is what we are going to
discuss next.
5.5 The Basic Operators of Quantum Mechanics
According to Bohmian mechanics, a particle whose wave function is real (up to a global phase),
for example an electron in the ground state of an atom, has vanishing velocity, even though the
quantum formalism assigns a nontrivial probability distribution to its momentum. It might thus
seem that we are faced with a conflict between the predictions of Bohmian mechanics and those
of the quantum formalism. This, however, is not so. The quantum predictions about momentum
concern the results of an experiment that happens to be called a momentum measurement and
a conflict with Bohmian mechanics with regard to momentum must reflect disagreement about
the results of such an experiment.
One may base such an experiment on free motion followed by a final measurement of posi-
tion.27 Consider a particle of mass m whose wave function at t = 0 is ψ = ψ(x). Suppose no
26Though passive, the apparatus here plays an important role in recording the final configuration of the system.
However, for experiments involving detections at different times, the apparatus plays an active role: Consider such
an experiment, with detections at times t1, . . . , tn, and final result Z = F (Xt1 , . . . , Xtn). Though the apparatus
introduces no extra randomness, it plays an essential role by changing the wave function of the system at the
times t1, . . . , tn and thus changing the evolution of its configuration. These changes are reflected in the POVM
structure that governs the statistical distribution of Z for such experiments (see Section 3.9).
27The emergence of the momentum operator in such so-called time-of-flight measurements was discussed by
Bohm in his 1952 article [15]. A similar derivation of the momentum operator can be found in Feynman and
Hibbs [34].
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forces are present, that is, that all the potentials acting on the particle are turned off, and let the
particle evolve freely. Then we measure the position XT that it has reached at the time t = T .
It is natural to regard VT = XT/T and PT = mXT/T as providing, for large T , approximations
to the asymptotic velocity and momentum of the particle. It turns out that the probability
distribution of PT , in the limit T → ∞, is exactly what quantum mechanics prescribes for the
momentum, namely |ψ˜(p)|2, where
ψ˜(p) = (Fψ)(p) = 1√
(2pi~)3
∫
e−
i
~
p·xψ(x) dx
is the Fourier transform of ψ.
This result can be easily understood: Observe that |ψT (x)|2 dx, the probability distribution
of XT , is the spectral measure µ
XˆT
ψ (dx) = 〈ψ, P XˆT (dx)ψ〉 of XˆT = U∗T XˆUT , the (Heisenberg)
position operator at time t = T ; here Ut is the free evolution operator and Xˆ is, as usual, the
position operator at time t = 0. By elementary quantum mechanics (specifically, the Heisenberg
equations of motion), XˆT =
1
m
PˆT + Xˆ, where Pˆ ≡ −i~∇ is the momentum operator. Thus
as T →∞ the operator mXˆT/T converges to the momentum operator Pˆ, since Xˆ/T is O(1/T ),
and the distribution of the random variable PT accordingly converges to the spectral measure of
Pˆ, given by |ψ˜(p)|2.28
The momentum operator arises from a (T →∞) limit of “no Y no Φ” single-particle exper-
iments, each experiment being defined by the unitary operator UT (the free particle evolution
operator up to time T ) and calibration FT (x) = mx/T . Other standard quantum-mechanical
operators emerge in a similar manner, i.e., from a T → ∞ limit of appropriate single-particle
experiments.
This is the case, for example, for the spin operator σz. As in Section 5.2, consider the evolu-
tion operator UT generated by Hamiltonian (5.7), but instead of (5.9), consider the calibration
FT (x) = 2mz/ a T
2. This calibration is suggested by (2.16), as well as by the explicit form of
the z-component of the position operator at time t = T ,
ZˆT = U
∗
T ZˆUT = Zˆ +
Pˆz
m
T +
a
2m
σz T
2 , (5.14)
which follows from the Heisenberg equations
m
d2Zˆt
d t2
= a σz ,
d Zˆt
d t
∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
= Pˆz ≡ −i~ ∂
∂z
, Zˆ0 = Zˆ .
28 This formal argument can be turned into a rigorous proof by considering the limit of the characteristic
function of PT , namely of the function fT (λ) =
∫
eiλ·p ρT (dp), where ρT is the distribution of mXT /T : fT (λ) =〈
ψ, exp
(
iλ ·mXˆT /T
)
ψ
〉
, and using the dominated convergence theorem [70] this converges as T → ∞ to
f(λ) =
〈
ψ, exp
(
i λ· Pˆ
)
ψ
〉
, implying the desired result. The same result can also be obtained using the well
known asymptotic formula (see, e.g., [69]) for the solution of the free Schro¨dinger equation with initial condition
ψ = ψ(x),
ψT (x) ∼
(m
iT
) 3
2
ei
mx2
2~T ψ˜(
mx
T
) for T →∞.
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Then, for initial state Ψ = ψ ⊗ Φ0 with suitable Φ0, where ψ = αψ(+) + βψ(−), the distribution
of the random variable
ΣzT = FT (XT ) =
2mZT
a T 2
converges as T → ∞ to the spectral measure of σz, with values +1 and −1 occurring with
probabilities |α|2 and |β|2, respectively.29 This is so, just as with the momentum, because as
T →∞ the operator 2mZˆT
aT 2
converges to σz.
We remark that we’ve made use above of the fact that simple algebraic manipulations on the
level of random variables correspond automatically to the same manipulations for the associated
operators. More precisely, suppose that
Z 7→ A (5.15)
in the sense (of (2.37)) that the distribution of the random variable Z is given by the spectral
measure for the self-adjoint operator A. Then it follows from (3.17) that
f(Z)→ f(A) (5.16)
for any (Borel) function f . For example, since XT 7→ XˆT , mXT/T 7→ mXˆT/T , and since ZT →
ZˆT ,
2mZT
aT 2
→ 2mZˆT
a T 2
. Similarly, if a random variable P 7→ Pˆ , then P 2/(2m) 7→ H0 = Pˆ 2/(2m).
This is rather trivial, but it is not as trivial as the failure even to distinguish Z and Zˆ would
make it seem.
5.6 From Positive-Operator-Valued Measures to Experiments
We wish here to point out that to a very considerable extent the association E 7→ O(dλ) of
experiments with POVMs is onto. It is more or less the case that every POVM arises from an
experiment.
We have in mind two distinct remarks. First of all, it was pointed out in the first paragraph
of Section 4.3 that every discrete POVM Oα (weak formal experiment) arises from some discrete
experiment E . Thus, for every POVM O(dλ) there is a sequence E (n) of discrete experiments for
which the corresponding POVMs O(n) converge to O.
The second point we wish to make is that to the extent that every PVM arises from an
experiment E = {Φ0, U, F}, so too does every POVM. This is based on the fact, mentioned at
the end of the introduction to Section 5, that every POVM O(dλ) can be regarded as arising
from the projection of a PVM E(dλ), acting on H(1), onto the subspace H ⊂ H(1). We may
assume without loss of generality that both H and H(1) ⊖ H are infinite dimensional (by some
otherwise irrelevant enlargements if necessary). Thus we can identify H(1) with H⊗Happaratus(1)
and the subspace with H⊗Φ(1)0 , for any choice of Φ(1)0 . Suppose now that there is an experiment
E
(1) = {Φ(2)0 , U, F} that measures the PVM E (i.e., that measures the observable A =
∫
λE(dλ))
where Φ
(2)
0 ∈ Happaratus(2) , U acts on H⊗Happaratus where Happaratus = Happaratus(1) ⊗Happaratus(2)
and F is a function of the configuration of the composite of the 3 systems: system, apparatus(1)
and apparatus(2). Then, with Φ0 = Φ
(1)
0 ⊗Φ(2)0 , E = {Φ0, U, F} is associated with the POVM O.
29For the Hamiltonian (5.7) no assumption on the initial state Ψ is required here; however (5.7) will be a
reasonably good approximation only when Ψ has a suitable form, expressing in particular that the particle is
appropriately moving towards the magnet.
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5.7 Invariance Under Trivial Extension
Suppose we change an experiment E to E ′ by regarding its x-system as containing more of the
universe that the x-system for E , without in any way altering what is physically done in the
experiment and how the result is specified. One would imagine that E ′ would be equivalent to E .
This would, in fact, be trivially the case classically, as it would if E were a genuine measurement,
in which case E ′ would obviously measure the same thing as E . This remains true for the more
formal notion of measurement under consideration here. The only source of nontriviality in
arriving at this conclusion is the fact that with E ′ we have to deal with a different, larger class
of initial wave functions.
We will say that E ′ is a trivial extension of E if the only relevant difference between E and
E
′ is that the x-system for E ′ has generic configuration x′ = (x, xˆ), whereas the x-system for E
has generic configuration x. In particular, the unitary operator U ′ associated with E ′ has the
form U ′ = U ⊗ Uˆ , where U is the unitary associated with E , implementing the interaction of the
x-system and the apparatus, while Uˆ is a unitary operator describing the independent evolution
of the xˆ-system, and the calibration F for E ′ is the same as for E . (Thus F does not depend
upon xˆ.)
The association of experiments with (generalized) observables (POVMs) is invariant under
trivial extension: if E 7→ O in the sense of (4.10) and E ′ is a trivial extension of E , then
E
′ 7→ O ⊗ I, where I is the identity on the Hilbert space of the xˆ-system.
To see this note that if E 7→ O then the sesquilinear map B arising from (5.2) for E ′ is of the
form
B(ψ1 ⊗ ψˆ1, ψ2 ⊗ ψˆ2) = 〈ψ1, Oψ2〉〈ψˆ1, ψˆ2〉
on product wave functions ψ′ = ψ ⊗ ψˆ, which easily follows from the form of U ′ and the fact
that F doesn’t depend upon xˆ, so that the xˆ-degrees of freedom can be integrated out. Thus the
POVM O′ for E ′ agrees with O ⊗ I on product wave functions, and since such wave functions
span the Hilbert space for the (x, xˆ)-system, we have that O′ = O ⊗ I. Thus E ′ 7→ O ⊗ I.
In other words, if E is a measurement of O, then E ′ is a measurement of O⊗ I. In particular,
if E is a measurement the self-adjoint operator A, then E ′ is a measurement of A⊗I. This result
is not quite so trivial as it would be were it concerned with genuine measurements, rather than
with the more formal notion under consideration here.
Now suppose that E ′ is a trivial extension of a discrete experiment E , with state transforma-
tions given by Rα. Then the state transformations for E
′ are given by R′α = Rα ⊗ Uˆ . This is so
because R′α must agree with Rα ⊗ Uˆ on product wave functions ψ′ = ψ ⊗ ψˆ, and these span the
Hilbert space of the (x, xˆ)-system.
5.8 POVMs and the Positions of Photons and Dirac Electrons
We have indicated how POVMs emerge naturally in association with Bohmian experiments.
We wish here to indicate a somewhat different role for a POVM: to describe the probability
distribution of the actual (as opposed to measured30) position. The probability distribution of
the position of a Dirac electron in the state ψ is ψ+ψ. This is given by a PVM E(dx) on the
one-particle Hilbert space H spanned by positive and negative energy electron wave functions.
However the physical one-particle Hilbert-space H+ consists solely of positive energy states, and
30The accurate measurement of the position of a Dirac electron is presumably impossible.
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this is not invariant under the projections E. Nonetheless the probability distribution of the
position of the electron is given by the POVM P+E(dx)P+ acting on H+, where P+ is the
orthogonal projection onto H+. Similarly, constraints on the photon wave function require the
use of POVMs for the localization of photons [54, 3].31
6 Density Matrices
The notion of a density matrix, a positive (trace class) operator with unit trace on the Hilbert
space of a system, is often regarded as providing the most general characterization of a quantum
state of that system. According to the quantum formalism, when a system is described by the
density matrix W , the expected value of an observable A is given by tr (WA). If A has PVM O,
and more generally for any POVM O, the probability that the (generalized) observable O has
value in ∆ is given by
Prob(O ∈ ∆) = tr (WO(∆)). (6.1)
A density matrix that is a one-dimensional projection, i.e., of the form |ψ〉〈ψ| where ψ is a unit
vector in the Hilbert space of the system, describes a pure state (namely, ψ), and a general
density matrix can be decomposed into a mixture of pure states ψk,
W =
∑
k
pk|ψk〉〈ψk| where
∑
k
pk = 1. (6.2)
Naively, one might regard pk as the probability that the system is in the state ψk. This
interpretation is, however, untenable, for a variety of reasons. First of all, the decomposition
(6.2) is not unique. A density matrix W that does not describe a pure state can be decomposed
into pure states in a variety of different ways.
It is always possible to decompose a density matrix W in such a way that its components ψk
are orthonormal. Such a decomposition will be unique except when W is degenerate, i.e., when
some pk’s coincide. For example, if p1 = p2 we may replace ψ1 and ψ2 by any other orthonormal
pair of vectors in the subspace spanned by ψ1 and ψ2. And even if W were nondegenerate, it
need not be the case that the system is in one of the states ψk with probability pk, because for
any decomposition (6.2), regardless of whether the ψk are orthogonal, if the wave function of the
system were ψk with probability pk, this situation would be described by the density matrix W .
Thus a general density matrix carries no information—not even statistical information—about
the actual wave function of the system. Moreover, a density matrix can describe a system that
has no wave function at all! This happens when the system is a subsystem of a larger system
whose wave function is entangled, i.e., does not properly factorize (in this case one usually speaks
of the reduced density matrix of the subsystem).
This impossibility of interpreting density matrices as real mixtures of pure states has been
regarded by many authors (e.g., von Neumann [74] and Landau [56]) as a further indication that
quantum randomness is inexplicable within the realm of classical logic and probability. However,
from the point of view of Bohmian mechanics, there is nothing mysterious about density matrices.
Indeed, their role and status within the quantum formalism can be understood very easily in terms
31For example, on the one-photon level, both the proposal Ψ = E + iB (where E and B are the electric and
the magnetic free fields) [12], and the proposal Ψ = A (where A is the vector potential in the Coulomb gauge)
[3], require the constraint ∇ ·Ψ = 0.
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of the general framework of experiments of Section 5. (It can, we believe, be reasonably argued
that even from the perspective of orthodox quantum theory, density matrices can be understood
in a straightforward way.)
6.1 Density Matrices and Bohmian Experiments
Consider a general experiment E 7→ O (see equation (4.10)) and suppose that the initial wave
function of the system is random with probability distribution p(dψ) (on the set of unit vectors
in H). Then nothing will change in the general argument of Section 5 except that now ρZψ in
(4.10) and (5.2) should be interpreted as the conditional probability given ψ. It follows then from
(6.1), using the fact that 〈ψ,O(∆)ψ〉 = tr (|ψ〉〈ψ|O(∆)), that the probability that the result of
E lies in ∆ is given by∫
p(dψ) 〈ψ,O(∆)ψ〉 = tr
(∫
p(dψ) |ψ〉〈ψ|O(∆)
)
= tr (WO(∆)) (6.3)
where32
W ≡
∫
p(dψ) |ψ〉〈ψ| (6.4)
is the ensemble density matrix arising from a random wave function with (ensemble) distribu-
tion p.
Now suppose that instead of having a random wave function, our system has no wave function
at all because it is entangled with another system. Then there is still an object that can naturally
be regarded as the state of our system, an object associated with the system itself in terms of
which the results of experiments performed on our system can be simply expressed. This object
is a density matrix W and the results are governed by (6.1). W is the reduced density matrix
arising from the state of the larger system. This is more or less an immediate consequence of
invariance under trivial extension, described in Section 5.7:
Consider a trivial extension E ′ of an experiment E 7→ O on our system—precisely what we
must consider if the larger system has a wave function ψ′ while our (smaller) system does not.
The probability that the result of E ′ lies in ∆ is given by
〈ψ′, O(∆)⊗ Iψ′〉 = tr ′ (|ψ′〉〈ψ′|O(∆)⊗ I) = tr (WO(∆)) , (6.5)
where tr ′ is the trace for the x′-system (the big system) and tr is the trace for the x-system. In
agreement with standard quantum mechanics, the last equality of (6.5) defines W as the reduced
density matrix of the x-system, i.e,
W ≡ t̂r (|ψ′〉〈ψ′|) (6.6)
where t̂r denotes the partial trace over the coordinates of the xˆ-system.
32Note that since p is a probability measure on the unit sphere in H, W is a positive trace class operator with
unit trace.
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6.2 Strong Experiments and Density Matrices
A strong formal experiment E ≡ {λα, Rα} generates state transformations ψ → Rαψ. This
suggests the following action on an initial state described by a density matrix W : When the
outcome is α, we have the transformation
W → RαW
tr (RαW ) ≡
RαWR
∗
α
tr (RαWR∗α)
(6.7)
where
RαW = RαWR∗α . (6.8)
After all, (6.7) is a density matrix naturally associated with Rα and W , and it agrees with
ψ → Rαψ for a pure state, W = |ψ〉〈ψ|. In order to show that (6.7) is indeed correct, we must
verify it for the two different ways in which our system might be assigned a density matrix W ,
i.e., for W an ensemble density matrix and for W a reduced density matrix.
Suppose the initial wave function is random, with distribution p(dψ). Then the initial
state of our system is given by the density matrix (6.4). When the outcome α is obtained,
two changes must be made in (6.4) to reflect this information: |ψ〉〈ψ| must be replaced by
(Rα|ψ〉〈ψ|R∗α)/‖Rαψ‖2, and p(dψ) must be replaced by p(dψ|α), the conditional distribution of
the initial wave function given that the outcome is α. For the latter we have
p(dψ|α) = ‖Rαψ‖
2
tr (RαWR∗α)
p(dψ)
(‖Rαψ‖2p(dψ) is the joint distribution of ψ and α and the denominator is the probability of
obtaining the outcome α.) Therefore W undergoes the transformation
W =
∫
p(dψ) |ψ〉〈ψ| →
∫
p(dψ|α) Rα|ψ〉〈ψ|R
∗
α
‖Rαψ‖2 =
∫
p(dψ)
Rα|ψ〉〈ψ|R∗α
tr (RαWR∗α)
=
RαWR
∗
α
tr (RαWR∗α)
.
We wish to emphasize that this demonstrates in particular the nontrivial fact that the density
matrixRαW/tr (RαW ) produced by the experiment depends only upon the initial density matrix
W . Though W can arise in many different ways, corresponding to the multiplicity of different
probability distributions p(dψ) yielding W via (6.4), insofar as the final state is concerned, these
differences don’t matter.
This does not, however, establish (6.7) when W arises not from a random wave function but
as a reduced density matrix. To deal with this case we consider a trivial extension E ′ of a discrete
experiment E with state transformations Rα. Then E
′ has state transformations Rα ⊗ Uˆ (see
Section 5.7). Thus, when the initial state of the x′-system is ψ′, the final state of the x-system
is given by the partial trace
t̂r
(
Rα ⊗ Uˆ |ψ′〉〈ψ′|R∗α ⊗ Uˆ∗
)
tr ′
(
Rα ⊗ Uˆ |ψ′〉〈ψ′|R∗α ⊗ Uˆ∗
) = t̂r (Rα ⊗ I|ψ′〉〈ψ′|R∗α ⊗ I)
tr ′ (Rα ⊗ I|ψ′〉〈ψ′|R∗α ⊗ I)
=
Rα t̂r (|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)R∗α
tr
(
Rαt̂r (|ψ′〉〈ψ′|)R∗α
)
=
RαWR
∗
α
tr (RαWR∗α)
,
where the cyclicity of the trace has been used.
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To sum up, when a strong experiment E ≡ {λα, Rα} is performed on a system described by
the initial density matrix W and the outcome α is obtained, the final density matrix is given by
(6.7); moreover, from the results of the previous section it follows that the outcome α will occur
with probability
pα = tr (WOα) = tr (WR
∗
αRα) = tr (RαW ) , (6.9)
where the last equality follows from the cyclicity of the trace.
6.3 The Notion of Instrument
We shall briefly comment on the relationship between the notion of strong formal experiment
and that of instrument (or effect) discussed by Davies [21].
Consider an experiment E ≡ {λα, Rα} on a system with initial density matrix W . Then a
natural object associated with E is the set function
R(∆)W ≡
∑
λα∈∆
RαW =
∑
λα∈∆
RαWR
∗
α . (6.10)
The set function R : ∆ 7→ R(∆) compactly expresses both the statistics of E for a general initial
system density matrix W and the effect of E on W conditioned on the occurrence of the event
“the result of E is in ∆”.
To see this, note first that it follows from (6.9) that the probability that the result of the
experiment lies in the set ∆ is given by
p(∆) = tr (R(∆)W ) .
The conditional distribution p(α|∆) that the outcome is α given that the result λα ∈ ∆ is then
tr (RαW )/tr (R(∆)W ). The density matrix that reflects the knowledge that the result is in α,
obtained by averaging (6.7) over ∆ using p(α|∆), is thus R(∆)W/tr (R(∆)W ).
It follows from (6.10) that R is a countably additive set function whose values are positive
preserving linear transformations in the space of trace-class operators in H. Any map with these
properties, not necessarily of the special form (6.10), is called an instrument.
6.4 On the State Description Provided by Density Matrices
So far we have followed the standard terminology and have spoken of a density matrix as de-
scribing the state of a physical system. It is important to appreciate, however, that this is merely
a frequently convenient way of speaking, for Bohmian mechanics as well as for orthodox quan-
tum theory. Insofar as Bohmian mechanics is concerned, the significance of density matrices is
neither more nor less than what is implied by their role in the quantum formalism as described
in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. While many aspects of the notion of (effective) wave function extend
to density matrices, in particular with respect to weak and strong experiments, density matrices
lack the dynamical implications of wave functions for the evolution of the configuration, a point
that has been emphasized by Bell [7]:
In the de Broglie-Bohm theory a fundamental significance is given to the wave func-
tion, and it cannot be transferred to the density matrix. . . .Of course the density
matrix retains all its usual practical utility in connection with quantum statistics.
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That this is so should be reasonably clear, since it is the wave function that determines, in
Bohmian mechanics, the evolution of the configuration, and the density matrix of a system does
not determine its wave function, even statistically. To underline the point we shall recall the
analysis of Bell [7]: Consider a particle described by a density matrix Wt evolving autonomously,
so that Wt = UtW0U
−1
t , where Ut is the unitary group generated by a Schro¨dinger Hamiltonian.
Then ρWt(x) ≡ Wt(x, x) ≡ 〈x|Wt|x〉 gives the probability distribution of the position of the
particle. Note that ρW satisfies the continuity equation
∂ρW
∂t
+ div JW = 0 where JW (x) =
~
m
Im [∇xW (x, x′)]x′=x .
This might suggest that the velocity of the particle should be given by v = JW/ρW , which
indeed agrees with the usual formula when W is a pure state (W (x, x′) = ψ(x)ψ∗(x′)). How-
ever, this extension of the usual formula to arbitrary density matrices, though mathemati-
cally “natural,” is not consistent with what Bohmian mechanics prescribes for the evolution
of the configuration. Consider, for example, the situation in which the wave function of a
particle is random, either ψ1 or ψ2, with equal probability. Then the density matrix is
W (x, x′) = 1
2
(ψ1(x)ψ
∗
1(x
′) + ψ2(x)ψ
∗
2(x
′)). But the velocity of the particle will be always ei-
ther v1 or v2 (according to whether the actual wave function is ψ1 or ψ2), and—unless ψ1 and ψ2
have disjoint supports—this does not agree with JW/ρW , an average of v1 and v2.
What we have just said is correct, however, only when spin is ignored. For particles with spin a
novel kind of density matrix emerges, a conditional density matrix, analogous to the conditional
wave function (2.6) and with an analogous dynamical role: Even though no conditional wave
function need exist for a system entangled with its environment when spin is taken into account,
a conditional density matrixW always exists, and is such that the velocity of the system is indeed
given by JW/ρW . See [31] for details.
A final remark: the statistical role of density matrices is basically different from that provided
by statistical ensembles, e.g, by Gibbs states in classical statistical mechanics. This is because,
as mentioned earlier, even when it describes a random wave function via (6.4), a density matrix
W does not determine the ensemble p(dψ) from which it emerges. The map defined by (6.4)
from probability measures p on the unit sphere in H to density matrices W is many-to-one.33
Consider, for example, the density matrix 1
n
I where I is the identity operator on an n-dimensional
Hilbert space H. Then a uniform distribution over the vectors of any given orthonormal basis
of H leads to this density matrix, as well as does the continuous uniform measure on the sphere
‖ψ‖ = 1. However, since the statistical distribution of the results of any experiment depends
on p only through W , different p’s associated with the same W are empirically equivalent in the
sense that they can’t be distinguished by experiments performed on a system prepared somehow
in the state W .
33This is relevant to the foundations of quantum statistical mechanics, for which the state of an isolated
thermodynamic system is usually described by the microcanonical density matrix Z−1δ(H − E), where Z =
tr δ(H − E) is the partition function. Which ensemble of wave functions should be regarded as forming the
thermodynamic ensemble? A natural choice is the uniform measure on the subspace H = E, which should be
thought of as fattened in the usual way. Note that this choice is quite distinct from another one that people often
have in mind: a uniform distribution over a basis of energy eigenstates of the appropriate energy. Depending
upon the choice made, we obtain different notions of typical equilibrium wave function.
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7 Genuine Measurements
We have so far discussed various interactions between a system and an apparatus relevant to the
quantum measurement formalism, from the very special ones formalized by “ideal measurements”
to the general situation described in section 5. It is important to recognize that nowhere in this
discussion was there any implication that anything was actually being measured. The fact that
an interaction with an apparatus leads to a pointer orientation that we call the result of the
experiment or “measurement” in no way implies that this result reflects anything of significance
concerning the system under investigation, let alone that it reveals some preexisting property of
the system—and this is what is supposed to be meant by the word measurement. After all [72],
“any old playing around with an indicating instrument in the vicinity of another body, whereby
at any old time one then takes a reading, can hardly be called a measurement of this body,”
and the fact the experiment happens to be associated, say, with a self-adjoint operator in the
manner we have described, so that the experiment is spoken of, in the quantum formalism, as a
measurement of the corresponding observable, certainly offers little support for using language
in this way.
We shall elaborate on this point later on. For now we wish to observe that the very gener-
ality of our analysis, particularly that of section 5, covering as it does all possible interactions
between system and apparatus, covers as well those particular situations that in fact are genuine
measurements. This allows us to make some definite statements about what can be measured in
Bohmian mechanics.
For a physical quantity, describing an objective property of a system, to be measurable means
that it is possible to perform an experiment on the system that measures the quantity, i.e.,
an experiment whose result conveys its value. In Bohmian mechanics a physical quantity ξ is
expressed by a function
ξ = f(X,ψ) (7.1)
of the complete state (X,ψ) of the system. An experiment E measuring ξ is thus one whose
result Z = F (XT , YT ) ≡ Z(X, Y,Ψ) equals ξ = f(X,ψ) ≡ ξ(X,ψ),
Z(X, Y,Ψ) = ξ(X,ψ), (7.2)
where X, Y , ψ and Ψ refer, as in Section 5, to the initial state of system and apparatus, imme-
diately prior to the measurement, and where the equality should be regarded as approximate,
holding to any desired degree of accuracy.
The most basic quantities are, of course, the state components themselves, namely X and ψ,
as well as the velocities
vk =
~
mk
Im
∇kψ(X)
ψ(X)
(7.3)
of the particles. One might also consider quantities describing the future behavior of the system,
such as the configuration of an isolated system at a later time, or the time of escape of a particle
from a specified region, or the asymptotic velocity discussed in Section 5.5. (Because the dynamics
is deterministic, all of these quantities are functions of the initial state of the system and are
thus of the form (7.1).)
We wish to make a few remarks about the measurability of these quantities. In particular,
we wish to mention, as an immediate consequence of the analysis at the beginning of Section 5,
a condition that must be satisfied by any quantity if it is to be measurable.
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7.1 A Necessary Condition for Measurability
Consider any experiment E measuring a physical quantity ξ. We showed in Section 5 that the
statistics of the result Z of E must be governed by a POVM, i.e., that the probability distribution
of Z must be given by a measure-valued quadratic map on the system Hilbert space H. Thus,
by (7.2),
ξ is measurable only if its probability distribution µψξ is a measure-valued quadratic
map on H.
(7.4)
As indicated earlier, the position X and the asymptotic velocity or momentum P have distri-
butions quadratic in ψ, namely µψX(dx) = |ψ(x)|2 and µψP(dp) = |ψ˜(p)|2, respectively. Moreover,
they are both measurable, basically because suitable local interactions exist to establish appro-
priate correlations with the relevant macroscopic variables. For example, in a bubble chamber
a particle following a definite path triggers a chain of reactions that leads to the formation of
(macroscopic) bubbles along the path.
The point we wish to make now, however, is simply this: the measurability of these quantities
is not a consequence of the fact that these quantities obey this measurability condition. We em-
phasize that this condition is merely a necessary condition for measurability, and not a sufficient
one. While it does follow that if ξ satisfies this condition there exists a discrete experiment that
is an approximate formal measurement of ξ (in the sense that the distribution of the result of
the experiment is approximately µψξ ), this experiment need not provide a genuine measurement
of ξ because the interactions required for its implementation need not exist and because, even if
they did, the result Z of the experiment might not be related to the quantity ξ in the right way,
i.e, via (7.2).
We now wish to illustrate the use of this condition, first transforming it into a weaker but
more convenient form. Note that any quadratic map µψ must satisfy
µψ1+ψ2 + µψ1−ψ2 = 2(µψ1 + µψ2)
and thus if µψ is also positive we have the inequality
µψ1+ψ2 ≤ 2(µψ1 + µψ2). (7.5)
Thus it follows from (7.4) that a quantity34
ξ must fail to be measurable if it has a possible value (one with nonvanishing
probability or probability density) when the wave function of the system is ψ1 + ψ2
that is neither a possible value when the wave function is ψ1 nor a possible value
when the wave function is ψ2.
(7.6)
(Here neither ψ1 nor ψ2 need be normalized.)
34This conclusion is also a more or less direct consequence of the linearity of the Schro¨dinger evolution: If
ψi ⊗ Φ0 7→ Ψi for all i, then
∑
ψi ⊗ Φ0 7→
∑
Ψi. But, again, our purpose here has been mainly to illustrate the
use of the measurability condition itself.
54
7.2 The Nonmeasurability of Velocity, Wave Function and Determin-
istic Quantities
It is an immediate consequence of (7.6) that neither the velocity nor the wave function is mea-
surable, the latter because the value “ψ1+ψ2” is neither “ψ1” nor “ψ2,” and the former because
every wave function ψ may be written as ψ = ψ1 + ψ2 where ψ1 is the real part of ψ and ψ2 is i
times the imaginary part of ψ, for both of which the velocity (of whatever particle) is 0.
Note that this is a very strong and, in a sense, surprising conclusion, in that it establishes the
impossibility of measuring what is, after all, a most basic dynamical variable for a deterministic
mechanical theory of particles in motion. It should probably be regarded as even more surprising
that the proof that the velocity—or wave function—is not measurable seems to rely almost on
nothing, in effect just on the linearity of the evolution of the wave function. However, one should
not overlook the crucial role of quantum equilibrium.
We observe that the nonmeasurability of the wave function is related to the impossibility of
copying the wave function. (This question arises sometimes in the form, “Can one clone the wave
function?” [36, 78, 37].) Copying would be accomplished, for example, by an interaction leading,
for all ψ, from ψ⊗φ0⊗Φ0 to ψ⊗ψ⊗Φ, but this is clearly incompatible with unitarity. We wish
here merely to remark that the impossibility of cloning can also be regarded as a consequence of
the nonmeasurability of the wave function. In fact, were cloning possible one could—by making
many copies—measure the wave function by performing suitable measurements on the various
copies. After all, any wave function ψ is determined by 〈ψ,Aψ〉 for sufficiently many observables
A and these expectation values can of course be computed using a sufficiently large ensemble.
By a deterministic quantity we mean any function ξ = f(ψ) of the wave function alone (which
thus does not inherit any irreducible randomness associated with the random configurationX). It
follows easily from (7.6) that no (nontrivial) deterministic quantity is measurable.35 In particular,
the mean value 〈ψ,Aψ〉 of an observable A (not a multiple of the identity) is not measurable—
though it would be were it possible to copy the wave function, and it can of course be measured
by a nonlinear experiment, see Section 7.4.
7.3 Initial Values and Final Values
Measurement is a tricky business. In particular, one may wonder how, if it is not measurable, we
are ever able to know the wave function of a system—which in orthodox quantum theory often
seems to be the only thing that we do know about it.
In this regard, it is important to appreciate that we were concerned in the previous section
only with initial values, with the wave function and the velocity prior to the measurement. We
shall now briefly comment upon the measurability of final values, produced by the experiment.
The nonmeasurability argument of Section 7.2 does not cover final values. This may be
appreciated by noting that the crucial ingredient in the analysis involves a fundamental time-
asymmetry: The probability distribution µψ of the result of an experiment is a quadratic func-
tional of the initial wave function ψ, not the final one—of which it is not a functional at all.
Moreover, the final velocity can indeed be measured, by a momentum measurement as described
in Section 5.5. (That such a measurement yields also the final velocity follows from the formula
in footnote 28 for the asymptotic wave function.) And the final wave function can be measured
35Note also that µψξ (dλ) = δ(λ− f(ψ))dλ seems manifestly nonquadratic in ψ (unless f is constant).
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by an ideal measurement of any nondegenerate observable, and more generally by any strong
formal measurement whose subspaces Hα are one-dimensional, see Section 3.5: If the outcome is
α, the final wave function is Rαψ = RαPHαψ, which is independent of the initial wave function
ψ (up to a scalar multiple).
We also wish to remark that this distinction between measurements of initial values and
measurements of final values has no genuine significance for passive measurements, that merely
reveal preexisting properties without in any way affecting the measured system. However, quan-
tum measurements are usually active; for example, an ideal measurement transforms the wave
function of the system into an eigenstate of the measured observable. But passive or active, a
measurement, by its very meaning, is concerned strictly speaking with properties of a system
just before its performance, i.e., with initial values. At the same time, to the extent that any
property of a system is conveyed by a typical quantum “measurement,” it is a property defined
by a final value.
For example, according to orthodox quantum theory a position measurement on a particle
with a spread-out wave function, to the extent that it measures anything at all, measures the
final position of the particle, created by the measurement, rather than the initial position, which
is generally regarded as not existing prior to the measurement. And even in Bohmian mechanics,
in which such a measurement may indeed reveal the initial position, which—if the measurement
is suitably performed—will agree with the final position, this measurement will still be active
since the wave function of the system must be transformed by the measurement into one that is
compatible with the sharper knowledge of the position that it provides, see Section 2.1.
7.4 Nonlinear Measurements and the Role of Prior Information
The basic idea of measurement is predicated on initial ignorance. We think of a measurement of
a property of a system as conveying that property by a procedure that does not seriously depend
upon the state of the system,36 any details of which must after all be unknown prior to at least
some engagement with the system. Be that as it may, the notion of measurement as codified
by the quantum formalism is indeed rooted in a standpoint of ignorance: the experimental
procedures involved in the measurement do not depend upon the state of the measured system.
And our entire discussion of measurement up to now has been based upon that very assumption,
that E itself does not depend on ψ (and certainly not on X).
If, however, some prior information on the initial system wave function ψ were available, we
could exploit this information to measure quantities that would otherwise fail to be measurable.
For example, for a single-particle system, if we somehow knew its initial wave function ψ then
a measurement of the initial position of the particle would convey its initial velocity as well,
via (7.3)—even though, as we have shown, this quantity isn’t measurable without such prior
information.
By a nonlinear measurement or experiment E = E ψ we mean one in which, unlike those
considered so far, one or more of the defining characteristics of the experiment depends upon ψ.
36This statement must be taken with a grain of salt. Some things must be known about the system prior to
measurement, for example, that it is in the vicinity the measurement apparatus, or that an atom whose angular
momentum we wish to measure is moving towards the relevant Stern Gerlach magnets, as well as a host of similar,
often unnoticed, pieces of information. This sort of thing does not much matter for our purposes in this paper
and can be safely ignored. Taking them into account would introduce pointless complications without affecting
the analysis in an essential way.
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For example, in the measurement of the initial velocity described in the previous paragraph, the
calibration function F = F ψ depends upon ψ.37 More generally we might have that U = Uψ or
Φ0 = Φ
ψ
0 .
The wave function can of course be measured by a nonlinear measurement—just let F ψ ≡ ψ.
Somewhat less trivially, the initial wave function can be measured, at least formally, if it is
known to be a member of a given orthonormal basis, by measuring any nondegenerate observable
whose eigenvectors form that basis. The proposals of Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman [1]
for measuring the wave function, though very interesting, are of this character—they involve
nonlinear measurements that depend upon a choice of basis containing ψ—and thus remain
controversial.38
7.5 A Position Measurement that Does not Measure Position
We began this section by observing that what is spoken of as a measurement in quantum theory
need not really measure anything. We mentioned, however, that in Bohmian mechanics the
position can be measured, and the experiment that accomplishes this would of course be a
measurement of the position operator. We wish here to point out, by means of a very simple
example, that the converse is not true, i.e., that a measurement of the position operator need
not be a measurement of the position.
Consider the harmonic oscillator in 2 dimensions with Hamiltonian
H = − ~
2
2m
( ∂2
∂x2
+
∂2
∂y2
)
+
ω2m
2
(x2 + y2) .
Except for an irrelevant time-dependent phase factor, the evolution ψt is periodic, with period
τ = 2pi/ω. The Bohm motion of the particle, however, need not have period τ . For example, the
(n = 1, m = 1)-state, which in polar coordinates is of the form
ψt(r, φ) =
mω
~
√
pi
re−
mω
2~
r2eiφe−i
3
2
ωt, (7.7)
generates a circular motion of the particle around the origin with angular velocity ~/(mr2), and
hence with periodicity depending upon the initial position of the particle—the closer to the origin,
the faster the rotation. Thus, in general,
Xτ 6= X0.
Nonetheless, Xτ and X0 are identically distributed random variables, since |ψτ |2 = |ψ0|2 ≡ |ψ|2.
We may now focus on two different experiments: Let E be a measurement of the actual
position X0, the initial position, and hence of the position operator, and let E
′ be an experiment
beginning at the same time as E but in which it is the position Xτ at time τ that is actually
measured. Since for all ψ the result of E ′ has the same distribution as the result of E , E ′ is also a
measurement of the position operator. But E ′ is not a measurement of the initial position since
37Suppose that Z1 = F1(QT ) = X is the result of the measurement of the initial position. Then F
ψ = Gψ ◦ F1
where Gψ(·) = ~
m
Im∇ψ
ψ
(·).
38In one of their proposals the wave function is “protected” by a procedure that depends upon the basis; in
another, involving adiabatic interactions, ψ must be a nondegenerate eigenstate of the Hamiltonian H of the
system, but it is not necessary that the latter be known.
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the position at time τ does not in general agree with the initial position: A measurement of the
position at time τ is not a measurement of the position at time 0. Thus, while a measurement
of position is always a measurement of the position operator,
A measurement of the position operator is not necessarily a genuine measurement of
position!
7.6 Theory Dependence of Measurement
The harmonic oscillator example provides a simple illustration of an elementary point that is
often ignored: in discussions of measurement it is well to keep in mind the theory under consid-
eration. The theory we have been considering here has been Bohmian mechanics. If, instead,
we were to analyze the harmonic oscillator experiments described above using different theories
our conclusions about results of measurements would in general be rather different, even if the
different theories were empirically equivalent. So we shall analyze the above experiment E ′ in
terms of various other formulations or interpretations of quantum theory.
In strict orthodox quantum theory there is no such thing as a genuine particle, and thus there
is no such thing as the genuine position of a particle. There is, however, a kind of operational
definition of position, in the sense of an experimental setup, where a measurement device yields
results the statistics of which are given by the position operator.
In naive orthodox quantum theory one does speak loosely about a particle and its position,
which is thought of—in a somewhat uncritical way—as being revealed by measuring the position
operator. Any experiment that yields statistics given by the position operator is considered a
genuine measurement of the particle’s position.39 Thus E ′ would be considered as a measurement
of the position of the particle at time zero.
The decoherent (or consistent) histories formulation of quantum mechanics [35, 65, 46] is
concerned with the probabilities of certain coarse-grained histories, given by the specification
of finite sequences of events, associated with projection operators, together with their times
of occurrence. These probabilities are regarded as governing the occurrence of the histories,
regardless of whether any of the events are measured or observed, but when they are observed,
the probabilities of the observed histories are the same as those of the unobserved histories. The
experiments E and E ′ are measurements of single-event histories corresponding to the position
of the particle at time 0 and at time τ , respectively. Since the Heisenberg position operators
Xˆτ = Xˆ0 for the harmonic oscillator, it happens to be the case, according to the decoherent
histories formulation of quantum mechanics, that for this system the position of the particle at
time τ is the same as its position at time 0 when the positions are unobserved, and that E ′ in
fact measures the position of the particle at time 0 (as well as the position at time τ).
The spontaneous localization or dynamical reduction models [38, 40] are versions of quantum
theory in which there are no genuine particles; in these theories reality is represented by the
wave function alone (or, more accurately, by entities entirely determined by the wave function).
In these models Schro¨dinger’s equation is modified by the addition of a stochastic term that
causes the wave function to collapse during measurement in a manner more or less consistent
with the quantum formalism. In particular, the performance of E or E ′ would lead to a random
collapse of the oscillator wave function onto a narrow spatial region, which might be spoken of
39This, and the failure to appreciate the theory dependence of measurements, has been a source of unfounded
criticisms of Bohmian mechanics(see [33, 24, 22]).
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as the position of the particle at the relevant time. But E ′ could not be regarded in any sense as
measuring the position at time 0, because the localization does not occur for E ′ until time τ .
Finally we mention stochastic mechanics [64], a theory ontologically very similar to Bohmian
mechanics in that the basic entities with which it is concerned are particles described by their
positions. Unlike Bohmian mechanics, however, the positions evolve randomly, according to a
diffusion process. Just as with Bohmian mechanics, for stochastic mechanics the experiment E ′
is not a measurement of the position at time zero, but in contrast to the situation in Bohmian
mechanics, where the result of the position measurement at time τ determines, given the wave
function, the position at time zero (via the Bohmian equation of motion), this is not so in
stochastic mechanics because of the randomness of the motion.
8 Hidden Variables
The issue of hidden variables concerns the question of whether quantum randomness arises in a
completely ordinary manner, merely from the fact that in orthodox quantum theory we deal with
an incomplete description of a quantum system. According to the hidden-variables hypothesis,
if we had at our disposal a sufficiently complete description of the system, provided by supple-
mentary parameters traditionally called hidden variables, the totality of which is usually denoted
by λ, the behavior of the system would thereby be determined, as a function of λ (and the
wave function). In such a hidden-variables theory, the randomness in results of measurements
would arise solely from randomness in the unknown variables λ. On the basis of a variety of
“impossibility theorems,” the hidden-variables hypothesis has been widely regarded as having
been discredited.
Note that Bohmian mechanics is just such a hidden-variables theory, with the hidden variables
λ given by the configuration Q of the total system. We have seen in particular that in a Bohmian
experiment, the result Z is determined by the initial configuration Q = (X, Y ) of the system and
apparatus. Nonetheless, there remains much confusion about the relationship between Bohmian
mechanics and the various theorems supposedly establishing the impossibility of hidden variables.
In this section we wish to make several comments on this matter.
8.1 Experiments and Random Variables
In Bohmian mechanics we understand very naturally how random variables arise in association
with experiments: the initial complete state (Q,Ψ) of system and apparatus evolves deterministi-
cally and uniquely determines the outcome of the experiment; however, as the initial configuration
Q is in quantum equilibrium, the outcome of the experiment is random.
A general experiment E is then always associated a random variable (RV) Z describing its
result. In other words, according to Bohmian mechanics, there is a natural association
E 7→ Z, (8.8)
between experiments and RVs. Moreover, whenever the statistics of the result of E is governed
by a self-adjoint operator A on the Hilbert space of the system, with the spectral measure of
A determining the distribution of Z, for which we shall write Z 7→ A (see (2.37)), Bohmian
mechanics establishes thereby a natural association between E and A
E 7→ A. (8.9)
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While for Bohmian mechanics the result Z depends in general on both X and Y , the initial
configurations of the system and of the apparatus, for many real-world experiments Z depends
only on X and the randomness in the result of the experiment is thus due solely to randomness in
the initial configuration of the system alone. This is most obvious in the case of genuine position
measurements (for which Z(X, Y ) = X). That in fact the apparatus need not introduce any extra
randomness for many other real-world experiments as well follows then from the observation that
the role of the apparatus in many real-world experiments is to provide suitable background fields,
which introduce no randomness, as well as a final detection, a measurement of the actual positions
of the particles of the system. In particular, this is the case for those experiments most relevant
to the issue of hidden variables, such as Stern-Gerlach measurements of spin, as well as for
momentum measurements and more generally scattering experiments, which are completed by a
final detection of position.
The result of these experiments is then given by a random variable
Z = F (XT ) = G(X) ,
where T is the final time of the experiment,40 on the probability space {Ω,P}, where Ω = {X}
is the set of initial configurations of the system and P(dx) = |ψ|2dx is the quantum equilibrium
distribution associated with the initial wave function ψ of the system. For these experiments
(see Section 5.4) the distribution of Z is always governed by a PVM, corresponding to some
self-adjoint operator A, Z 7→ A, and thus Bohmian mechanics provides in these cases a natural
map E 7→ A.
8.2 Random Variables, Operators, and the Impossibility Theorems
We would like to briefly review the status of the so-called impossibility theorems for hidden
variables, the most famous of which are due to von Neumann [74], Gleason [41], Kochen and
Specker [53], and Bell [5]. Since Bohmian mechanics exists, these theorems can’t possibly estab-
lish the impossibility of hidden variables, the widespread belief to the contrary notwithstanding.
What these theorems do establish, in great generality, is that there is no “good” map from self-
adjoint operators on a Hilbert space H to random variables on a common probability space,
A 7→ Z ≡ ZA , (8.10)
where ZA = ZA(λ) should be thought of as the result of “measuring A” when the hidden variables,
that complete the quantum description and restore determinism, have value λ. Different senses
of “good” correspond to different impossibility theorems.
For any particular choice of λ, say λ0, the map (8.10) is transformed to a value map
A 7→ v(A) (8.11)
40Concerning the most common of all real-world quantum experiments, scattering experiments, although they
are completed by a final detection of position, this detection usually occurs, not at a definite time T , but at a
random time, for example when a particle enters a localized detector. Nonetheless, for computational purposes
the final detection can be regarded as taking place at a definite time T . This is a consequence of the flux-across-
surfaces theorem [19, 26, 27], which establishes an asymptotic equivalence between flux across surfaces (detection
at a random time) and scattering into cones (detection at a definite time).
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from self-adjoint operators to real numbers (with v(A) = ZA(λ0)). The stronger impossibility
theorems establish the impossibility of a good value map, again with different senses of “good”
corresponding to different theorems.
Note that such theorems are not very surprising. One would not expect there to be a “good”
map from a noncommutative algebra to a commutative one.
One of von Neumann’s assumptions was, in effect, that the map (8.10) be linear. While
mathematically natural, this assumption is physically rather unreasonable and in any case is
entirely unnecessary. In order to establish that there is no good map (8.10), it is sufficient to
require that the map be good in the minimal sense that the following agreement condition is
satisfied:
Whenever the quantum mechanical joint distribution of a set of self-adjoint opera-
tors (A1, . . . , Am) exists, i.e., when they form a commuting family, the joint distribu-
tion of the corresponding set of random variables, i.e., of (ZA1, . . . , ZAm), agrees with
the quantum mechanical joint distribution.
The agreement condition implies that all deterministic relationships among commuting ob-
servables must be obeyed by the corresponding random variables. For example, if A, B and C
form a commuting family and C = AB, then we must have that ZC = ZAZB since the joint
distribution of ZA, ZB and ZC must assign probability 0 to the set {(a, b, c) ∈ R3|c 6= ab}.
This leads to a minimal condition for a good value map A 7→ v(A), namely that it preserve
functional relationships among commuting observables: For any commuting family A1, . . . , Am,
whenever f(A1, . . . , Am) = 0 (where f : R
m → R represents a linear, multiplicative, or any
other relationship among the Ai’s), the corresponding values must satisfy the same relationship,
f(v(A1), . . . , v(Am)) = 0.
The various impossibility theorems correctly demonstrate that there are no maps, from self-
adjoint operators to random variables or to values, that are good, merely in the minimal senses
described above.41
We note that while the original proofs of the impossibility of a good value map, in particular
that of the Kochen-Specker theorem, were quite involved, in more recent years drastically simpler
proofs have been found (for example, by Peres [67], by Greenberg, Horne, and Zeilinger [45], and
by Mermin [62]).
In essence, one establishes the impossibility of a good map A 7→ ZA or A 7→ v(A) by show-
ing that the v(A)’s, or ZA’s, would have to satisfy impossible relationships. These impossible
relationships are very much like the following: ZA = ZB = ZC 6= ZA. However no impossible
relationship can arise for only three quantum observables, since they would have to form a com-
muting family, for which quantum mechanics would supply a joint probability distribution. Thus
the quantum relationships can’t possibly lead to an inconsistency for the values of the random
variables in this case.
With four observables A,B,C, and D it may easily happen that [A,B] = 0, [B,C] = 0,
[C,D] = 0, and [D,A] = 0 even though they don’t form a commuting family (because, say,
[A,C] 6= 0). It turns out, in fact, that four observables suffice for the derivation of impossible
41Another natural sense of good map A 7→ v(A) is given by the requirement that v(A) ∈ sp (A), where
A = (A1, . . . , Am) is a commuting family, v(A) = (v(A1), . . . , v(Am)) ∈ Rm and sp (A) is the joint spectrum of
the family. That a map good in this sense is impossible follows from the fact that if α = (α1, . . . αm) ∈ sp (A),
then α1, . . . αm must obey all functional relationships for A1, . . . , Am.
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quantum relationships. Perhaps the simplest example of this sort is due to Hardy [48], who
showed that for almost every quantum state for two spin 1/2 particles there are four observables
A,B,C, and D (two of which happen to be spin components for one of the particles while
the other two are spin components for the other particle) whose quantum mechanical pair-wise
distributions for commuting pairs are such that a good map to random variables must yield
random variables ZA, ZB, ZC , and ZD obeying the following relationships:
(1) The event {ZA = 1 and ZB = 1} has positive probability (with an optimal choice of the
quantum state, about .09).
(2) If {ZA = 1} then {ZD = 1}.
(3) If {ZB = 1} then {ZC = 1}.
(4) The event {ZD = 1 and ZC = 1} has probability 0.
Clearly, there exist no such random variables.
The point we wish to emphasize here, however, is that although they are correct and although
their hypotheses may seem minimal, these theorems are nonetheless far less relevant to the
possibility of a deterministic completion of quantum theory than one might imagine. In the
next subsection we will elaborate on how that can be so. We shall explain why we believe such
theorems have little physical significance for the issues of determinism and hidden variables. We
will separately comment later in this section on Bell’s related nonlocality analysis [5], which does
have profound physical implications.
8.3 Contextuality
It is a simple fact there can be no map A 7→ ZA, from self-adjoint operators onH (with dim (H) ≥
3) to random variables on a common probability space, that is good in the minimal sense that the
joint probability distributions for the random variables agree with the corresponding quantum
mechanical distributions, whenever the latter ones are defined. But does not Bohmian mechanics
yield precisely such a map? After all, have we not emphasized how Bohmian mechanics naturally
associates with any experiment a random variable Z giving its result, in a manner that is in
complete agreement with the quantum mechanical predictions for the result of the experiment?
Given a quantum observable A, let ZA be then the result of a measurement of A. What gives?
Before presenting what we believe to be the correct response, we mention some possible re-
sponses that are off-target. It might be objected that measurements of different observables will
involve different apparatuses and hence different probability spaces. However, one can simul-
taneously embed all the relevant probability spaces into a huge common probability space. It
might also be objected that not all self-adjoint operators can be realistically be measured. But
to arrive at inconsistency one need consider, as mentioned in the last subsection, only 4 observ-
ables, each of which are spin components and are thus certainly measurable, via Stern-Gerlach
experiments. Thus, in fact, no enlargement of probability spaces need be considered to arrive at
a contradiction, since as we emphasized at the end of Section 8.1, the random variables giving the
results of Stern-Gerlach experiments are functions of initial particle positions, so that for joint
measurements of pairs of spin components for 2-particles the corresponding results are random
variables on the common probability space of initial configurations of the 2 particles, equipped
with the quantum equilibrium distribution determined by the initial wave function.
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There must be a mistake. But where could it be? The mistake occurs, in fact, so early that it
is difficult to notice it. It occurs at square one. The difficulty lies not so much in any conditions
on the map A 7→ ZA, but in the conclusion that Bohmian mechanics supplies such a map at all.
What Bohmian mechanics naturally supplies is a map E 7→ ZE , from experiments to random
variables. When ZE 7→ A, so that we speak of E as a measurement of A (E 7→ A), this very
language suggests that insofar as the random variable is concerned all that matters is that E
measures A, and the map E 7→ ZE becomes a map A 7→ ZA. After all, if E were a genuine
measurement of A, revealing, that is, the preexisting (i.e., prior to the experiment) value of the
observable A, then Z would have to agree with that value and hence would be an unambiguous
random variable depending only on A.
But this sort of argument makes sense only if we take the quantum talk of operators as
observables too seriously. We have emphasized in this paper that operators do naturally arise in
association with quantum experiments. But there is little if anything in this association, beyond
the unfortunate language that is usually used to describe it, that supports the notion that the
operator A associated with an experiment E is in any meaningful way genuinely measured by
the experiment. From the nature of the association itself, it is difficult to imagine what this
could possibly mean. And for those who think they imagine some meaning in this talk, the
impossibility theorems show they are mistaken.
The bottom line is this: in Bohmian mechanics the random variables Z
E
giving the results of
experiments E depend, of course, on the experiment, and there is no reason that this should not
be the case when the experiments under consideration happen to be associated with the same
operator. Thus with any self-adjoint operator A, Bohmian mechanics naturally may associate
many different random variables ZE , one for each different experiment E 7→ A associated with
A. A crucial point here is that the map E 7→ A is many-to-one.42
Suppose we define a map A 7→ ZA by selecting, for each A, one of the experiments, call
it E A, with which A is associated, and define ZA to be ZE A. Then the map so defined can’t
be good, because of the impossibility theorems; moreover there is no reason to have expected
the map to be good. Suppose, for example, that [A,B] = 0. Should we expect that the joint
distribution of ZA and ZB will agree with the joint quantum mechanical distribution of A and
B? Only if the experiments E A and E B used to define ZA and ZB both involved a common
experiment that “simultaneously measures A and B,” i.e., an experiment that is associated with
the commuting family (A,B). If we consider now a third operator C such that [A,C] = 0, but
[B,C] 6= 0, then there is no choice of experiment E that would permit the definition of a random
variable ZA relevant both to a “simultaneous measurement of A and B” and a “simultaneous
measurement of A and C” since no experiment is a “simultaneous measurement of A, B, and
C.” In the situation just described we must consider at least two random variables associated
with A, ZA,B and ZA,C, depending upon whether we are considering an experiment “measuring
A and B” or an experiment “measuring A and C.” It should be clear that when the random
variables are assigned to experiments in this way, the possibility of conflict with the predictions
of orthodox quantum theory is eliminated. It should also be clear, in view of what we have
42We wish to remark that, quite aside from this many-to-oneness, the random variables Z
E
cannot generally be
regarded as corresponding to any sort of natural property of the “measured” system. Z
E
, in general a function
of the initial configuration of the system-apparatus composite, may fail to be a function of the configuration of
the system alone. And even when, as is often the case, Z
E
does depend only on the initial configuration of the
system, owing to chaotic dynamics this dependence could have an extremely complex character.
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repeatedly stressed, that quite aside from the impossibility theorems, this way of associating
random variables with experiments is precisely what emerges in Bohmian mechanics.
The dependence of the result of a “measurement of the observable A” upon the other ob-
servables, if any, that are “measured simultaneously together with A”—e.g., that ZA,B and ZA,C
may be different—is called contextuality : the result of an experiment depends not just on “what
observable the experiment measures” but on more detailed information that conveys the “con-
text” of the experiment. The essential idea, however, if we avoid misleading language, is rather
trivial: that the result of an experiment depends on the experiment.
To underline this triviality we remark that for two experiments, E and E ′, that “measure
A and only A” and involve no simultaneous “measurement of another observable,” the results
Z
E
and Z
E
′ may disagree. For example in Section 7.5 we described experiments E and E ′ both
of which “measured the position operator” but only one of which measured the actual initial
position of the relevant particle, so that for these experiments in general Z
E
6= Z
E
′ .
One might feel, however, that in the example just described the experiment that does not
measure the actual position is somewhat disreputable—even though it is in fact a “measurement
of the position operator.” We shall therefore give another example, due to D. Albert [2], in which
the experiments are as simple and canonical as possible and are entirely on the same footing.
Let E ↑ and E ↓ be Stern-Gerlach measurements of A = σz , with E ↓ differing from E ↑ only in that
the polarity of the Stern-Gerlach magnet for E ↓ is the reverse of that for E ↑. (In particular, the
geometry of the magnets for E ↑ and E ↓ is the same.) If the initial wave function ψsymm and the
magnetic field ±B have sufficient reflection symmetry with respect to a plane between the poles
of the Stern-Gerlach magnets, the particle whose spin component is being “measured” cannot
cross this plane of symmetry, so that if the particle is initially above, respectively below, the
symmetry plane, it will remain above, respectively below, that plane. But because their magnets
have opposite polarity, E ↑ and E ↓ involve opposite calibrations: F↑ = −F↓. It follows that
Z
ψsymm
E ↑
= −Zψsymm
E ↓
and the two experiments completely disagree about the “value of σz” in this case.
The essential point illustrated by the previous example is that instead of having in Bohmian
mechanics a natural association σz 7→ Zσz , we have a rather different pattern of relationships,
given in the example by
E ↑ → ZE ↑
E ↓ → ZE ↓
ց
ր σz,
8.4 Against “Contextuality”
The impossibility theorems require the assumption of noncontextuality, that the random variable
Z giving the result of a “measurement of quantum observable A” should depend on A alone,
further experimental details being irrelevant. How big a deal is contextuality, the violation of
this assumption? Here are two ways of describing the situation:
1. In quantum mechanics (or quantum mechanics supplemented with hidden variables), ob-
servables and properties have a novel, highly nonclassical aspect: they (or the result of
measuring them) depend upon which other compatible properties, if any, are measured
together with them.
In this spirit, Bohm and Hiley [16] write that (page 109)
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the quantum properties imply . . . that measured properties are not intrinsic but
are inseparably related to the apparatus. It follows that the customary language
that attributes the results of measurements . . . to the observed system alone can
cause confusion, unless it is understood that these properties are actually depen-
dent on the total relevant context.
They later add that (page 122)
The context dependence of results of measurements is a further indication of
how our interpretation does not imply a simple return to the basic principles
of classical physics. It also embodies, in a certain sense, Bohr’s notion of the
indivisibility of the combined system of observing apparatus and observed object.
2. The result of an experiment depends upon the experiment. Or, as expressed by Bell [10]
(pg.166),
A final moral concerns terminology. Why did such serious people take so seri-
ously axioms which now seem so arbitrary? I suspect that they were misled by
the pernicious misuse of the word ‘measurement’ in contemporary theory. This
word very strongly suggests the ascertaining of some preexisting property of some
thing, any instrument involved playing a purely passive role. Quantum exper-
iments are just not like that, as we learned especially from Bohr. The results
have to be regarded as the joint product of ‘system’ and ‘apparatus,’ the com-
plete experimental set-up. But the misuse of the word ‘measurement’ makes it
easy to forget this and then to expect that the ‘results of measurements’ should
obey some simple logic in which the apparatus is not mentioned. The resulting
difficulties soon show that any such logic is not ordinary logic. It is my impres-
sion that the whole vast subject of ‘Quantum Logic’ has arisen in this way from
the misuse of a word. I am convinced that the word ‘measurement’ has now
been so abused that the field would be significantly advanced by banning its use
altogether, in favour for example of the word ‘experiment.’
With one caveat, we entirely agree with Bell’s observation. The caveat is this: We do not
believe that the difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics is quite as crucial
for Bell’s moral as his language suggests it is. For any experiment, quantum or classical, it would
be a mistake to regard any instrument involved as playing a purely passive role, unless the
experiment is a genuine measurement of a property of a system, in which case the result is
determined by the initial conditions of the system alone. However, a relevant difference between
classical and quantum theory remains: Classically it is usually taken for granted that it is in
principle possible to measure any observable without seriously affecting the observed system,
which is clearly false in quantum mechanics (or Bohmian mechanics).43
Mermin has raised a similar question [62] (pg. 811):
Is noncontextuality, as Bell seemed to suggest, as silly a condition as von Neu-
mann’s . . . ?
To this he answers:
43The assumption could (and probably should) also be questioned classically.
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I would not characterize the assumption of noncontextuality as a silly constraint on
a hidden-variables theory. It is surely an important fact that the impossibility of
embedding quantum mechanics in a noncontextual hidden-variables theory rests not
only on Bohr’s doctrine of the inseparability of the objects and the measuring instru-
ments, but also on a straightforward contradiction, independent of one’s philosophic
point of view, between some quantitative consequences of noncontextuality and the
quantitative predictions of quantum mechanics.
This is a somewhat strange answer. First of all, it applies to von Neumann’s assumption (lin-
earity), which Mermin seems to agree is silly, as well as to the assumption of noncontextuality.
And the statement has a rather question-begging flavor, since the importance of the fact to
which Mermin refers would seem to depend on the nonsilliness of the assumption which the fact
concerns.
Be that as it may, Mermin immediately supplies his real argument for the nonsilliness of
noncontextuality. Concerning two experiments for “measuring observable A,” he writes that
it is . . . an elementary theorem of quantum mechanics that the joint distribution . . .
for the first experiment yields precisely the same marginal distribution (for A) as
does the joint distribution . . . for the second, in spite of the different experimental
arrangements. . . . The obvious way to account for this, particularly when entertaining
the possibility of a hidden-variables theory, is to propose that both experiments reveal
a set of values for A in the individual systems that is the same, regardless of which
experiment we choose to extract them from. . . . A contextual hidden-variables account
of this fact would be as mysteriously silent as the quantum theory on the question of
why nature should conspire to arrange for the marginal distributions to be the same
for the two different experimental arrangements.
A bit later, Mermin refers to the “striking insensitivity of the distribution to changes in the
experimental arrangement.”
For Mermin there is a mystery, something that demands an explanation. It seems to us,
however, that the mystery here is very much in the eye of the beholder. It is first of all somewhat
odd that Mermin speaks of the mysterious silence of quantum theory concerning a question whose
answer, in fact, emerges as an “elementary theorem of quantum mechanics.” What better way
is there to answer questions about nature than to appeal to our best physical theories?
More importantly, the “two different experimental arrangements,” say E 1 and E 2, considered
by Mermin are not merely any two randomly chosen experimental arrangements. They obviously
must have something in common. This is that they are both associated with the same self-adjoint
operator A in the manner we have described: E 1 7→ A and E 2 7→ A. It is quite standard to say in
this situation that both E 1 and E 2 measure the observable A, but both for Bohmian mechanics
and for orthodox quantum theory the very meaning of the association with the operator A is
merely that the distribution of the result of the experiment is given by the spectral measures
for A. Thus there is no mystery in the fact that E 1 and E 2 have results governed by the same
distribution, since, when all is said and done, it is on this basis, and this basis alone, that we are
comparing them.
(One might wonder how it could be possible that there are two different experiments that are
related in this way. This is a somewhat technical question, rather different from Mermin’s, and it
is one that Bohmian mechanics and quantum mechanics readily answer, as we have explained in
this paper. In this regard it would probably be good to reflect further on the simplest example of
such experiments, the Stern-Gerlach experiments E ↑ and E ↓ discussed in the previous subsection.)
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It is also difficult to see how Mermin’s proposed resolution of the mystery, “that both experi-
ments reveal a set of values for A . . . that is the same, regardless of which experiment we choose
to extract them from,” could do much good. He is faced with a certain pattern of results in two
experiments that would be explained if the experiments did in fact genuinely measure the same
thing. The experiments, however, as far as any detailed quantum mechanical analysis of them
is concerned, don’t appear to be genuine measurements of anything at all. He then suggests
that the mystery would be resolved if, indeed, the experiments did measure the same thing, the
analysis to the contrary notwithstanding. But this proposal merely replaces the original mystery
with a bigger one, namely, of how the experiments could in fact be understood as measuring the
same thing, or anything at all for that matter. It is like explaining the mystery of a talking cat
by saying that the cat is in fact a human being, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.
A final complaint about contextuality: the terminology is misleading. It fails to convey with
sufficient force the rather definitive character of what it entails: “Properties” that are merely
contextual are not properties at all; they do not exist, and their failure to do so is in the strongest
sense possible!
8.5 Nonlocality, Contextuality and Hidden Variables
There is, however, a situation where contextuality is physically relevant. Consider the EPRB
experiment, outlined at the end of Section 3.6. In this case the dependence of the result of a
measurement of the spin component σ1 · a of a particle upon which spin component of a distant
particle is measured together with it—the difference between Zσ1·a, σ2·b and Zσ1·a, σ2·c (using the
notation described in the seventh paragraph of Section 8.3)—is an expression of nonlocality, of,
in Einstein words, a “spooky action at distance.” More generally, whenever the relevant context
is distant, contextuality implies nonlocality.
Nonlocality is an essential feature of Bohmian mechanics: the velocity, as expressed in the
guiding equation (2.2), of any one of the particles of a many-particle system will typically depend
upon the positions of the other, possibly distant, particles whenever the wave function of the
system is entangled, i.e., not a product of single-particle wave functions. In particular, this is
true for the EPRB experiment under examination. Consider the extension of the single particle
Hamiltonian (2.12) to the two-particle case, namely
H = − ~
2
2m1
∇
2
1 −
~2
2m2
∇
2
2 − µ1σ1·B(x1)− µ2σ2·B(x2).
Then for initial singlet state, and spin measurements as described in Sections 2.5 and 5.2, it
easily follows from the laws of motion of Bohmian mechanics that
Zσ1·a, σ2·b 6= Zσ1·a, σ2·c .
This was observed long ago by Bell [6]. In fact, Bell’s examination of Bohmian mechanics
led him to his celebrated nonlocality analysis. In the course of his investigation of Bohmian
mechanics he observed that ([10], p. 11)
in this theory an explicit causal mechanism exists whereby the disposition of one piece
of apparatus affects the results obtained with a distant piece.
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Bohm of course was well aware of these features of his scheme, and has given them
much attention. However, it must be stressed that, to the present writer’s knowledge,
there is no proof that any hidden variable account of quantum mechanics must have
this extraordinary character. It would therefore be interesting, perhaps, to pursue
some further “impossibility proofs,” replacing the arbitrary axioms objected to above
by some condition of locality, or of separability of distant systems.
In a footnote, Bell added that “Since the completion of this paper such a proof has been found.”
This proof was published in his 1964 paper [5], ”On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox,” in
which he derives Bell’s inequality, the basis of his conclusion of quantum nonlocality.
We find it worthwhile to reproduce here the analysis of Bell, deriving a simple inequality
equivalent to Bell’s, in order to highlight the conceptual significance of Bell’s analysis and, at
the same time, its mathematical triviality. The analysis involves two parts. The first part, the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument applied to the EPRB experiment, amounts to the observation
that for the singlet state the assumption of locality implies the existence of noncontextual hidden
variables. More precisely, it implies, for the singlet state, the existence of random variables
Z iα = Zα·σi , i = 1, 2, corresponding to all possible spin components of the two particles, that
obey the agreement condition described in Section 8.2. In particular, focusing on components in
only 3 directions a, b and c for each particle, locality implies the existence of 6 random variables
Z iα i = 1, 2 α = a, b, c
such that
Z iα = ±1 (8.12)
Z1α = −Z2α (8.13)
and, more generally,
Prob(Z1α 6= Z2α) = qαβ, (8.14)
the corresponding quantum mechanical probabilities. This conclusion amounts to the idea that
measurements of the spin components reveal preexisting values (the Z iα), which, assuming locality,
is implied by the perfect quantum mechanical anticorrelations [5]:
Now we make the hypothesis, and it seems one at least worth considering, that if the
two measurements are made at places remote from one another the orientation of one
magnet does not influence the result obtained with the other. Since we can predict in
advance the result of measuring any chosen component of σ2, by previously measuring
the same component of σ1, it follows that the result of any such measurement must
actually be predetermined.
People very often fail to appreciate that the existence of such variables, given locality, is not
an assumption but a consequence of Bell’s analysis. Bell repeatedly stressed this point (by
determinism Bell here means the existence of hidden variables):
It is important to note that to the limited degree to which determinism plays a
role in the EPR argument, it is not assumed but inferred. What is held sacred is the
principle of ‘local causality’ – or ‘no action at a distance’. . . .
It is remarkably difficult to get this point across, that determinism is not a pre-
supposition of the analysis. ([10], p. 143)
Despite my insistence that the determinism was inferred rather than assumed, you
might still suspect somehow that it is a preoccupation with determinism that creates
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the problem. Note well then that the following argument makes no mention whatever
of determinism. . . . Finally you might suspect that the very notion of particle, and
particle orbit . . . has somehow led us astray. . . . So the following argument will
not mention particles, nor indeed fields, nor any other particular picture of what
goes on at the microscopic level. Nor will it involve any use of the words ‘quantum
mechanical system’, which can have an unfortunate effect on the discussion. The
difficulty is not created by any such picture or any such terminology. It is created
by the predictions about the correlations in the visible outputs of certain conceivable
experimental set-ups. ([10], p. 150)
The second part of the analysis, which unfolds the “difficulty . . . created by the . . . correla-
tions,” involves only very elementary mathematics. Clearly,
Prob
({Z1a = Z1b} ∪ {Z1b = Z1c} ∪ {Z1c = Z1a}) = 1 .
since at least two of the three (2-valued) variables Z1α must have the same value. Hence, by
elementary probability theory,
Prob
(
Z1a = Z
1
b
)
+ Prob
(
Z1b = Z
1
c
)
+ Prob
(
Z1c = Z
1
a
) ≥ 1,
and using the perfect anticorrelations (8.13) we have that
Prob
(
Z1a = −Z2b
)
+ Prob
(
Z1b = −Z2c
)
+ Prob
(
Z1c = −Z2a
) ≥ 1, (8.15)
which is equivalent to Bell’s inequality and in conflict with (8.14). For example, when the angles
between a, b and c are 1200 the 3 relevant quantum correlations qαβ are all 1/4.
To summarize the argument, let H be the hypothesis of the existence of the noncontextual
hidden variables we have described above. Then the logic of the argument is:
Part 1: quantum mechanics + locality ⇒ H (8.16)
Part 2: quantum mechanics ⇒ not H (8.17)
Conclusion: quantum mechanics ⇒ not locality (8.18)
To fully grasp the argument it is important to appreciate that the identity of H—the existence
of the noncontextual hidden variables—is of little substantive importance. What is important is
not so much the identity of H as the fact that H is incompatible with the predictions of quantum
theory. The identity of H is, however, of great historical significance: It is responsible for the
misconception that Bell proved that hidden variables are impossible, a belief until recently almost
universally shared by physicists.
Such a misconception has not been the only reaction to Bell’s analysis. Roughly speaking,
we may group the different reactions into three main categories, summarized by the following
statements:
1. Hidden variables are impossible.
2. Hidden variables are possible, but they must be contextual.
3. Hidden variables are possible, but they must be nonlocal.
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Statement 1 is plainly wrong. Statement 2 is correct but not terribly significant. Statement 3
is correct, significant, but nonetheless rather misleading. It follow from (8.16) and (8.17) that
any account of quantum phenomena must be nonlocal, not just any hidden variables account.
Bell’s argument shows that nonlocality is implied by the predictions of standard quantum theory
itself. Thus if nature is governed by these predictions, then nature is nonlocal. (That nature is
so governed, even in the crucial EPR-correlation experiments, has by now been established by a
great many experiments, the most conclusive of which is perhaps that of Aspect [4].)
9 Against Naive Realism About Operators
Traditional naive realism is the view that the world is pretty much the way it seems, populated by
objects which force themselves upon our attention as, and which in fact are, the locus of sensual
qualities. A naive realist regards these “secondary qualities,” for example color, as objective,
as out there in the world, much as perceived. A decisive difficulty with this view is that once
we understand, say, how our perception of what we call color arises, in terms of the interaction
of light with matter, and the processing of the light by the eye, and so on, we realize that the
presence out there of color per se would play no role whatsoever in these processes, that is, in
our understanding what is relevant to our perception of “color.” At the same time, we may also
come to realize that there is, in the description of an object provided by the scientific world-view,
as represented say by classical physics, nothing which is genuinely “color-like.”
A basic problem with quantum theory, more fundamental than the measurement problem
and all the rest, is a naive realism about operators, a fallacy which we believe is far more serious
than traditional naive realism: With the latter we are deluded partly by language but in the
main by our senses, in a manner which can scarcely be avoided without a good deal of scientific
or philosophical sophistication; with the former we are seduced by language alone, to accept a
view which can scarcely be taken seriously without a large measure of (what often passes for)
sophistication.
Not many physicists—or for that matter philosophers—have focused on the issue of naive
realism about operators, but Schro¨dinger and Bell have expressed similar or related concerns:
. . . the new theory [quantum theory] . . . considers the [classical] model suitable for
guiding us as to just which measurements can in principle be made on the relevant
natural object. . . .Would it not be pre-established harmony of a peculiar sort if the
classical-epoch researchers, those who, as we hear today, had no idea of what measur-
ing truly is, had unwittingly gone on to give us as legacy a guidance scheme revealing
just what is fundamentally measurable for instance about a hydrogen atom!? [72]
Here are some words which, however legitimate and necessary in application, have no
place in a formulation with any pretension to physical precision: system; apparatus;
environment; microscopic, macroscopic; reversible, irreversible; observable; informa-
tion; measurement.
. . . The notions of “microscopic” and “macroscopic” defy precise definition.
. . . Einstein said that it is theory which decides what is “observable”. I think he
was right. . . . “observation” is a complicated and theory-laden business. Then that
notion should not appear in the formulation of fundamental theory. . . .
On this list of bad words from good books, the worst of all is “measurement”. It
must have a section to itself. [11]
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We agree almost entirely with Bell here. We insist, however, that “observable” is just as bad
as “measurement,” maybe even a little worse. Be that as it may, after listing Dirac’s measurement
postulates Bell continues:
It would seem that the theory is exclusively concerned about “results of measure-
ment”, and has nothing to say about anything else. What exactly qualifies some
physical systems to play the role of “measurer”? Was the wave function of the world
waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature
appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system
. . . with a Ph.D.? If the theory is to apply to anything but highly idealized labora-
tory operations, are we not obliged to admit that more or less “measurement-like”
processes are going on more or less all the time, more or less everywhere. Do we not
have jumping then all the time?
The first charge against “measurement”, in the fundamental axioms of quantum
mechanics, is that it anchors the shifty split of the world into “system” and “appa-
ratus”. A second charge is that the word comes loaded with meaning from everyday
life, meaning which is entirely inappropriate in the quantum context. When it is said
that something is “measured” it is difficult not to think of the result as referring to
some preexisting property of the object in question. This is to disregard Bohr’s insis-
tence that in quantum phenomena the apparatus as well as the system is essentially
involved. If it were not so, how could we understand, for example, that “measure-
ment” of a component of “angular momentum” . . . in an arbitrarily chosen direction
. . . yields one of a discrete set of values? When one forgets the role of the appara-
tus, as the word “measurement” makes all too likely, one despairs of ordinary logic
. . . hence “quantum logic”. When one remembers the role of the apparatus, ordinary
logic is just fine.
In other contexts, physicists have been able to take words from ordinary language
and use them as technical terms with no great harm done. Take for example the
“strangeness”, “charm”, and “beauty” of elementary particle physics. No one is
taken in by this “baby talk”. . . .Would that it were so with “measurement”. But in
fact the word has had such a damaging effect on the discussion, that I think it should
now be banned altogether in quantum mechanics. (Ibid.)
While Bell focuses directly here on the misuse of the word “measurement” rather than on
that of “observable,” it is worth noting that the abuse of “measurement” is in a sense inseparable
from that of “observable,” i.e., from naive realism about operators. After all, one would not be
very likely to speak of measurement unless one thought that something, some “observable” that
is, was somehow there to be measured.
Operationalism, so often used without a full appreciation of its consequences, may lead many
physicists to beliefs which are the opposite of what one might expect. Namely, by believing
somehow that a physical property is and must be defined by an operational definition, many
physicists come to regard properties such as spin and polarization, which can easily be opera-
tionally defined, as intrinsic properties of the system itself, the electron or photon, despite all the
difficulties that this entails. If operational definitions were banished, and “real definitions” were
required, there would be far less reason to regard these “properties” as intrinsic, since they are
not defined in any sort of intrinsic way; in short, we have no idea what they really mean, and
there is no reason to think they mean anything beyond the behavior exhibited by the system in
interaction with an apparatus.
There are two primary sources of confusion, mystery and incoherence in the foundations of
quantum mechanics: the insistence on the completeness of the description provided by the wave
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function, despite the dramatic difficulties entailed by this dogma, as illustrated most famously by
the measurement problem; and naive realism about operators. While the second seems to point
in the opposite direction from the first, the dogma of completeness is in fact nourished by naive
realism about operators. This is because naive realism about operators tends to produce the
belief that a more complete description is impossible because such a description should involve
preexisting values of the quantum observables, values that are revealed by measurement. And
this is impossible. But without naive realism about operators—without being misled by all the
quantum talk of the measurement of observables—most of what is shown to be impossible by the
impossibility theorems would never have been expected to begin with.
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